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In 1999, Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar coined the term “market manip-
ulation” to describe how companies exploit the cognitive limitations of con-
sumers.  For example, everything costs $9.99 because consumers see the price
as closer to $9 than $10.  Although widely cited by academics, the concept of
market manipulation has had only a modest impact on consumer protection
law.
This Article demonstrates that the concept of market manipulation is de-
scriptively and theoretically incomplete, and updates the framework of the the-
ory to account for the realities of a marketplace that is mediated by
technology.  Today’s companies fastidiously study consumers and, increas-
ingly, personalize every aspect of the consumer experience.  Furthermore,
rather than waiting for the consumer to approach the marketplace, companies
can reach consumers anytime and anywhere.  The result of these and related
trends is that firms can not only take advantage of a general understanding of
cognitive limitations, but can uncover, and even trigger, consumer frailty at an
individual level.
A new theory of digital market manipulation reveals the limits of con-
sumer protection law and exposes concrete economic and privacy harms that
regulators will be hard-pressed to ignore.  This Article thus both meaningfully
advances the behavioral law and economics literature and harnesses that liter-
ature to explore and address an impending sea change in the way firms use
data to persuade.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent marketing study touched off something of an Internet
uproar.  The study purported to show that women feel less attractive
on Monday mornings.1  Based on its findings, the study recommended
that companies concentrate on these “prime vulnerability moments”
to sell beauty products.2  Or consider reputable psychological research
suggesting that willpower is a finite resource that can be depleted or
replenished throughout the day.3  What if an advertiser had a way to
count how many decisions you had made, or determine your present
emotional state?  That advertiser might try to reach you at your most
susceptible.  An obese person trying to avoid snacking between meals
could receive a text on his phone from the nearest donut shop exactly
when he was least likely to resist.
If this sounds dystopian or far-fetched, consider two recent sto-
ries by the same publisher.  The first report focuses on how the retail
giant Target used customer purchase history to determine who among
its customers was pregnant, following which Target apparently di-
rected hidden ads related to babies to those customers.4  A second
article describes the “extraordinary” lengths to which food manufac-
tures go to scientifically engineer cravings.5  Either story alone raises
1 See Rebecca J. Rosen, Is This the Grossest Advertising Strategy of All Time?, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 3, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/is-this-the-gross-
est-advertising-strategy-of-all-time/280242/.
2 See id.
3 See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE
GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 1–5 (2011) (collecting various studies).
4 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at 30, 54–55.
5 See Michael Moss, ((Salt + Fat2) / Satisfying Crunch) × Pleasing Mouth Feel = A Food
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eyebrows.  Taken together, these accounts bring us closer than com-
fort to the scenario described in the previous paragraph.6
Investigative journalists and academics have explored the art and
science of persuasion for decades.  Vance Packard famously chroni-
cled the ascension of “depth manipulation,” a brand of marketing fu-
eled by advances in motivational analysis, in the late 1950s.7  Although
the notorious subliminal advertising experiments of James McDonald
Vicary were debunked,8 media coverage of the use of subliminal ad-
vertising reached a fever pitch, and the Federal Communications
Commission twice considered if the technique may be against public
interest.9  Research into various methods of persuading consumers
continues.  In just the past few years, several scholars and commenta-
tors, notably Joseph Turow and Eli Pariser, have explored the explo-
sion of online marketing and its costs to privacy and other values.10
Designed to Addict, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 24, 2013, at 34; see also John Tierney, To Choose Is
to Lose, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 21, 2011, at 32, 34 (“When people fended off the temptation to
scarf down M&M’s [sic] or freshly baked chocolate-chip cookies, they were then less able to
resist other temptations.”).
6 Furthermore, companies as ubiquitous as Mondelez International, the brand behind
Cadbury chocolates and Trident gum, are investigating how to increase impulse buying with
digitally-enhanced shelves that detect and respond to the individual aspects of the shopper. See
Clint Boulton, Snackmaker Modernizes the Impulse Buy with Sensors, Analytics, WALL ST. J.
CIO J. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/11/snackmaker-modern-
izes-the-impulse-buy-with-sensors-analytics/.
7 VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 11–17 (rev. ed. 1981) (describing the as-
cension of the “depth approach”).
8 See Stuart Rogers, How a Publicity Blitz Created the Myth of Subliminal Advertising,
PUB. REL. Q., Winter 1992–1993, at 12, 12–17 (discussing James Vicary’s work).
9 Public Notice Concerning the Broadcast of Information By Means of “Subliminal Per-
ception” Techniques, 39 Fed. Reg. 3714 (Jan. 29, 1974); Public Notice Concerning the Use of
“Subliminal Perception” Advertising by Television Stations, 40 F.C.C. 10 (1957).  The contro-
versy resurfaced just a few years ago when two United States Senators wrote a letter to the FCC
saying they had “reason to believe that broadcasters are airing television advertisements that
contain subliminal messages.” See Press Statement of Gloria Tristani, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n (Mar. 9, 2001) (on file with The George Washington Law Review) (explaining that the
Senators believed the Republic National Committee had created ads attempting subliminally to
associate Vice President Al Gore with the word “RATS” and that the Commission investigated
but ultimately dismissed the allegation).
10 E.g., ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU
14–18 (2011); JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
1–2 (2006) [hereinafter TUROW, NICHE ENVY]; JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE
NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 1–2 (2011)
[hereinafter TUROW, THE DAILY YOU]; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive The-
ory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2022–33 (2013) (analyzing the discriminatory ef-
fect of big data on some consumers).
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Other academics refer to the growing influence of companies over
consumers without sustained analysis.11
What remains conspicuously missing from this literature is a rig-
orous account of why and when leveraging data against the consumer
becomes a problem worthy of legal intervention.  We might bristle
were a social network to subtly blend our profile picture with that of a
company spokesperson to make online ads more attractive.12  But how
does using the consumer’s own face to advertise to that specific con-
sumer differ from using the face of a celebrity?  What is the difference
between placing impulse items by the counter and texting an offer to
consumers when they are at their most impulsive?  In other words,
when does personalization become an issue of consumer protection?
Legal academics and officials in particular are going to require such an
account if they are to develop laws and policies in response to some
practices and not others.13
11 E.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1955–56
(2013) (noting that “[s]urveillance also gives the watcher increased power to persuade”).  Tal
Zarsky devotes a few paragraphs to the relationship between profiling and persuasion in a short
book chapter, but without offering an account of its mechanics, contours, or harms, beyond
noting that personalized persuasion is “manipulative.”  Tal Z. Zarsky, Online Privacy, Tailoring,
and Persuasion, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CON-
VERSATION 209, 219–21 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006).
12 See Conference Program, 32nd Annual Advertising and Consumer Psychology Confer-
ence: Consumer Psychology in a Social Media World 11 (June 13–15, 2013), http://www.myscp.
org/pdf/ACP%20Final%20Schedule.pdf [hereinafter Conference Program, Consumer Psychol-
ogy in a Social Media World) (describing panel entitled Visceral Targeting: Using Personalized
Face Composites for Implicit Targeted Marketing); see also Jeremy N. Bailenson et al., Facial
Similarity Between Voters and Candidates Causes Influence, 72 PUB. OPINION. Q. 935, 935–61
(2008).  Nothing in a social network’s terms of service or privacy policy would stand in the way of
this potentially lucrative practice. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM (Jan. 19, 2013), http://
instagram.com/legal/privacy/# (“[W]e may use information that we receive to . . . provide person-
alized content and information to you and others, which could include online ads or other forms
of marketing . . . .”); Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM (Jan. 19, 2013), http://instagram.com/legal/terms/
# (“[Y]ou hereby grant to Instagram a non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable,
sub-licensable, worldwide license to use the Content that you post on or through the Service,
subject to the Service’s Privacy Policy . . . .”).  Moreover, in its Terms of Use, Instagram states,
“You acknowledge that we may not always identify paid services, sponsored content, or commer-
cial communications as such.” Terms of Use, supra.
13 Richard Craswell and others have explored the line between deceptive and nondecep-
tive advertising. See generally Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 657 (1985) [hereinafter Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising]; Richard Craswell,
Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 549
(1991).  David Hoffman has developed a comprehensive account of “puffery,” meaning the prac-
tice of exaggerating the quality of goods and services.  David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery
Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006).  These and other accounts, however, do not account
for the mediating effects of contemporary technology.
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In response to these growing concerns, this Article advances two
novel arguments.  The first is that the digitization of commerce dra-
matically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at a per-
sonal level.  A specific set of emerging technologies and techniques
will empower corporations to discover and exploit the limits of each
individual consumer’s ability to pursue his or her own self-interest.
Firms will increasingly be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability
in consumers—leading to actual and perceived harms that challenge
the limits of consumer protection law, but which regulators can
scarcely ignore.
The second argument is that behavioral economics, once it inte-
grates the full relevance of the digital revolution, furnishes the best
framework by which to understand and evaluate this emerging chal-
lenge.  The interplay between rational choice and consumer bias that
is at the heart of behavioral economics helps illustrate how informa-
tion and design advantages might translate into systematic consumer
vulnerability.  Therefore, this Article both meaningfully advances the
behavioral law and economics literature and harnesses that literature
to understand and address the future of advertising.
To develop these two arguments, Part I of this Article discusses
the origins and basic implications of market manipulation theory.
Part II anticipates the future of market manipulation in the digital
age, describing how the mediation of consumers, and the various tech-
niques it allows, stands to generate dramatic asymmetries of informa-
tion and control between firms and consumers.  Part III responds to
the skepticism that often accompanies claims about the evolution of
selling, including: (1) the claim that the “new” technique is function-
ally indistinguishable from marketing that already exists, (2) the view
that there is no real harm to markets or consumers, and (3) the asser-
tion that the technique, even if new and harmful, cannot be regulated
consistent with the First Amendment.  Part IV follows the prevailing
wisdom of law and economics, behavioral and otherwise, in asserting
that the way to address the problem is to alter corporate incentives.
This Part offers two novel interventions?imposing research ethics on
companies and forcing firms to offer a paid version of their services
that come with added privacy protections?as examples of the regula-
tory or self-regulatory path consumer protection law might follow to
address the coming challenge.
Finally, Part V describes the import of this Article’s insights for
behavioral economics as a whole and lays out an empirical and theo-
retical agenda for future research.  There is some limited recognition
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of the importance of data to behavioral economics already.  Cass Sun-
stein has recently explored the power of more personalized targeting
of consumers.14  Lior Strahilevitz and Ariel Porat, following expressly
on the work of Sunstein, Ian Ayres, and George Geis, discuss setting
legal defaults that vary by citizen and with context.15  Hanson and
Kysar offered in passing that disclosures could be targeted based on
demographics.16  These limited forays into the personalization of be-
havioral economics yield valuable insights, but in a sense barely
scratch the surface.  Certain phenomena remain entirely unexplored.
Others are not taken to their logical extension.  The availability of
data about people, coupled with the power to make sense of this data
and apply the insights in real time, will lend the behavioral turn an
even greater relevance to law and daily life.
I. THE ORIGINS OF MARKET MANIPULATION THEORY
In a pair of articles published in 1999, Jon Hanson and Douglas
Kysar developed a concept they call “market manipulation.”17  Market
manipulation is best understood as one possible move within the
broader conversation around behavioral law and economics.  Champi-
oned by Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, and others, the
market manipulation movement supplements and challenges law and
economics with the extensive evidence that people do not always be-
have rationally in their best interest as traditional economic models
assume.18  Rather, to borrow a phrase from Dan Ariely, humans are
“predictably irrational.”19  Accordingly, regulations that assume ra-
tional behavior may be doomed to fail, whereas appreciating the cog-
nitive limitations and biases citizens and officials face can better
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1399
(2011) (“Other default rules are personalized, in the sense that they draw on available informa-
tion about which approach best suits individuals, and potentially even each individual, in the
relevant population.”).
15 See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2014) (observing that variable legal defaults may
be more effective in changing citizen behavior).
16 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evi-
dence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1564–65 (1999).
17 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1425; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Tak-
ing Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 747
(1999).
18 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1474 (1998).
19 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS, at xx (2008) (“[Human] irrationality happens the same way, again and again.”).
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predict legal outcomes and improve policymaking overall.20  Thus,
proponents of “debiasing” believe we can use the law to counter
known biases and improve decisionmaking.21  For example, advocates
of “libertarian paternalism,” colloquially known as “nudging,” believe
we should acknowledge and even exploit irrational human tendencies
in order to nudge citizens toward better outcomes while still leaving
individuals technically capable of resisting government intervention if
strongly inclined.22
In this context, market manipulation is, essentially, nudging for
profit.  “Once one accepts that individuals systematically behave in
nonrational ways,” argue Hanson and Kysar, “it follows from an eco-
nomic perspective that others will exploit those tendencies for gain.”23
The foundation of this theory is that companies and other firms will
use what they know about human psychology to set prices, draft con-
tracts, minimize perceptions of danger or risk, and otherwise attempt
to extract as much rent as possible from their consumers.24  The result,
according to the authors, is an entirely new source of market failure
due to the forces of behaviorism.25  Importantly, firms not only have
the capability of engaging in market manipulation, but also an eco-
nomic incentive: if some market actors leverage bias, those that do not
could be edged out of the market.26
Fifteen years have passed since Hanson and Kysar developed the
concept of market manipulation.27  Today, the theory remains an ele-
gant way to think about a range of consumer problems and is widely
20 This is particularly true of the many regimes that rely on mandatory disclosure. See,
e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1031–32 (2012) (privacy); Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques
of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 199, 242 (2005) (lending); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclo-
sure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 494–97 (2007) (securities);
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lend-
ing: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (2006) (lending).
21 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
200–01 (2006); see also Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING 316, 317 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007).
22 E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–8 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003); Richard
H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, and Paternalism: Liberta-
rian Paternalism, AM. ECON. REV., May 2003, at 175, 175–79.
23 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 635.
24 See id. at 637.
25 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1555.
26 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 726.
27 See id.
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cited by academics.28  In practice, however, market manipulation has
had only a modest impact on regulatory policy.29  In 2011, the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought its first case addressing the un-
fairness of negative option marketing (which exploits status quo bias)
against an egregious website with content that bordered on fraud.30
Other than this case, very few enforcement proceedings specifically
refer to the exploitation of cognitive bias, and there are several in-
stances where the FTC and other agencies have all but ignored it.31
One reason why market manipulation may not have received sus-
tained scrutiny is that its effects, while pervasive, are limited.32  Maybe
a consumer pays a little extra for a product, for instance, or purchases
an item on impulse.  Thus, both the downside for consumers and, im-
portantly, the upside for firms, have proven only marginal to date.
Several trends, each intimately related to data, could dramatically
accelerate the use of market manipulation by firms in the coming
years.  The consumer of the future is a mediated consumer—she ap-
proaches the marketplace through technology designed by someone
else.33  As a consequence, firms can generate a fastidious record of
28 See infra note 29.
29 The difference between the academic and policy reception is dramatic.  A recent
Westlaw search revealed that Taking Behavioralism Seriously, Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17,
has been cited 238 times.  Of those results, 235 documents were secondary sources such as law
review articles.  Only one court has cited the piece and no official regulatory source has done so.
The story is virtually identical with Taking Behavioralism Seriously, Hanson & Kysar, supra note
16, with the Westlaw search revealing 224 citations, 209 of which are in secondary sources.
30 See generally FTC v. Willms, No. 2:11-cv-00828-MJP (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2012) (stipu-
lated final judgment and order); see also 16 C.F.R § 425 (2014) (imposing requirements on nega-
tive option marketing).
31 One example is bid-to-pay auctions, which leverage the endowment effect and optimism
bias to generate as high as 500 percent profits on average consumer goods. See Jeff Atwood,
Profitable Until Deemed Illegal, CODING HORROR (Dec. 11, 2008), http://blog.codinghorror.com/
profitable-until-deemed-illegal/.  If anything, regulators have themselves developed a taste for
nudging citizens toward policy goals. See Adam Burgess, ‘Nudging’ Healthy Lifestyles: The UK
Experiments with the Behavioural Alternative to Regulation and the Market, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG.
3, 4 (2012); Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science of Change, TIME, Apr. 13, 2009,
at 28, 29–30.
32 Cf. Jolls et al., supra note 18, at 1511–12 (“Behavioral analysis predicts that if trades are
occurring frequently in a given jurisdiction at terms far from those of the reference transaction,
there will be strong pressure for a law banning such trades.”).
33 I use the term “mediated” in a practical sense to refer to the fact that consumers liter-
ally experience commercial, civic, and personal life through the technology they use, including
mobile phones, tables, kiosks, and the like.  There is a long-standing, but recently accelerating,
surveillance literature that explores the mediating influence of society on subjects in a more
theoretical frame. See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assem-
blage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605, 605–06 (2000); Katarina Giritli Nygren & Katarina L. Gidlund, The
Pastoral Power of Technology.  Rethinking Alienation in Digital Culture, 10 TRIPLEC 509, 510–11
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their transaction with the consumer and, importantly, personalize
every aspect of the interaction.34  This permits firms to surface the spe-
cific ways each individual consumer deviates from rational decision-
making, however idiosyncratic, and leverage that bias to the firm’s
advantage.35  Whereas sellers have always gotten a “feel” for consum-
ers, and although much online advertising today is already automatic,
this new combination of interpersonal manipulation with large-scale
data presents a novel challenge to consumers and regulators alike.36
II. THE MEDIATED CONSUMER
For a time, consumers transacted with businesses face-to-face; to-
day’s consumer purchases products or services through some interac-
tive or networked device?a kiosk, vending machine, laptop, tablet, or
phone designed by someone else.  A credit card company or a bank
facilitates payment.  Brick-and-mortar stores, outdoor billboards,
even everyday appliances, are beginning to have interfaces and con-
nect to a network.37
That technology mediates a consumer’s interactions with the mar-
ket has several consequences.  The first is that technology captures
and retains intelligence on the consumer’s interaction with a given
firm.  Today, consumer interactions leave a record of the consumer’s
behavior.  A conservative list of information a commercial website
might collect could include how many times the consumer has been to
the website before; what website the consumer was visiting immedi-
ately before arriving; what pages the consumer visited, and for how
long; what items the consumer purchased; what items the consumer
almost purchased; where the consumer physically was; and what com-
(2012).  Thank you to Julie Cohen for flagging this helpful distinction.  This Article self-con-
sciously adopts a technocratic stance which assumes, with the liberal tradition, the existence of a
market and of market actors who can take material advantage of one another. Cf. Julie E.
Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 241, 245 (2012) (describing
“[s]cholarship in the technocratic market-calibration mode”).
34 See infra Part II.
35 Another consequence, developed in Part II, is that firms do not have to wait for con-
sumers to enter the marketplace.  Rather, constant screen time and more and more networked
or “smart” devices mean that consumers can be approached anytime, anywhere.
36 See infra Part II.
37 In a comic book depicting the effect of technology on society, Ge´rald Santucci estimates
that about fifty billion devices will be networked by 2015 into an “Internet of Things.” See
Ge´rald Santucci, Foreword to ALEXANDRA INST., INSPIRING THE INTERNET OF THINGS! 3, 3
(Mirko Presser ed., 2011), available at http://www.alexandra.dk/uk/services/publications/docu-
ments/iot_comic_book.pdf.
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puter or browser the consumer was using.38  Furthermore, firms might
combine the data with public or private information purchased from a
third party.39  Using this compiled and stored information, firms can
then run complex algorithms to convert mere behavior into insight
(and value).40
A second, less-studied consequence of the mediated consumer is
that firms can and do design every aspect of the interaction with the
consumer.  This refers not only to the legal expectations of the trans-
action?embodied in terms of use, warranties, or other documents
sounding essentially in contract?but to both the physical and virtual
interface where the interaction occurs.  After all, the digital content
giant Apple does not travel to a website the consumer designed from
scratch to sell music.  In their discussion of market manipulation, Han-
son and Kysar at one point refer to the resources firms pour into “at-
mospherics,” meaning the layout and presentation of retail space.41
Atmospherics as a term, however, fails to capture the exquisite con-
trol that firms increasingly exert over virtual and physical space.
A third consequence of consumer mediation is that firms can in-
creasingly choose when to approach consumers, rather than wait until
the consumer has decided to enter a market context.  The Federal
Trade Commission has long recognized the distinct issues raised by in-
person solicitation.42  The difference between normal consumer inter-
action and in-person solicitation lies in the consumer’s inability to
adopt a critical frame of mind prior to entering the marketplace, as
well as the difficulty of escaping the interaction without rudeness.43  In
an age of constant “screen time,” however, in which consumers carry
or even wear devices that connect them to one or more companies, an
offer is always an algorithm away.44  This trend of firms initiating the
38 See Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 899, 901–04 (2011).
39 Id. at 901.
40 See Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of
the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH.
1, 6–8 (2002–2003); see also Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerg-
ing Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 272–73 (2008) (describing
the capabilities of data mining).
41 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1445–46.
42 See, e.g., Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 UCLA L. REV.
883, 895–922 (1969).  The FTC promulgated regulations in 1972, for instance, by imposing a
“cooling off” period for door-to-door sales.  Cooling-off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 37 Fed.
Reg. 22934, 22937 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2014)).
43 See id.; The Direct Selling Industry, supra note 42, at 920–21.
44 37 Fed. Reg. at 22939 n.44 (“The door to door selling technique strips from the con-
sumer one of the fundamentals in his role as an informed purchaser, the decision as to when,
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interaction with the consumer will only accelerate as our thermome-
ters, appliances, glasses, watches, and other artifacts become
networked into an “Internet of Things.”45
Despite the concerns raised by these consequences, there are also
upsides to consumer mediation.  For instance, an extensive record of
consumer-firm interaction could make it easier to detect interpersonal
fraud and reverse its effects.  Firms often use what they learn about
consumer habits in order to personalize and otherwise improve their
services.46  Mediation, thus, can empower consumers to protect them-
selves and police the market.47  In addition to these identity protec-
tions, Scott Peppet argues that “augmented reality”—i.e., adding a
layer of mediation to everyday interactions—will permit consumers to
more easily compare prices or terms.48  “Use your phone’s camera to
scan the bar code on a potential purchase,” Peppet points out, “and
Amazon or Consumer Reports will instantly return price comparisons
and consumer reviews.”49  Like Peppet, Eric Goldman believes in the
positive aspects of mediation, arguing that far from disadvantaging
consumers, mediation makes possible a kind of “Coasean filter” that
could screen out negative content in favor of relevant and helpful
commercial messages.50
Consumer mediation holds dangers as well.  Even general knowl-
edge of consumer psychology, coupled with clever design, can lead to
abuse.51  Busy consumers who purchase digital content on their com-
where, and how he will present himself to the marketplace.”); cf. James G. Webster, User Infor-
mation Regimes: How Social Media Shape Patterns of Consumption, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 598
(2010) (describing the difference between the “pull” method of audience building and the
“push” or “interruption” method).
45 See DAVE EVANS, CISCO, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF
THE INTERNET IS CHANGING EVERYTHING 3 (2011); see also Santucci, supra note 37, at 3.
46 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
47 See Calo, supra note 20, at 1041–44 (describing the disclosure technique of “showing”
consumers how their data is used, instead of merely telling them how others might use their
data).
48 Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer
Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 679 (2012).
49 Id.; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 10, at 2029 (“[P]rotecting privacy seems to thwart
price and service discrimination while fostering statistical discrimination on the basis of race and
gender and lowering production costs.”).
50 Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1202–09.
Although possible in theory, today’s filters are not run for the benefit of consumers and how
these filters will be used in the future is unclear.  Furthermore, as Goldman acknowledges,
“[m]arketers are notorious for finding ways to bypass filters.” Id. at 1207 n.285.
51 West Point computer scientist Gregory Conti refers to “malicious interfaces” that are
the opposite of usable or user-centric. See Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Inter-
face Design: Exploiting the User, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
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puters, tablets, or phones presumably care about how long it takes for
the content to download.52  Researchers showed how an “upgrade” to
the Apple operating system changed the appearance of the download
progress bar to create the impression that downloading was occurring
more quickly.53  Similarly, faced with complaints about cell service
coverage in a previous version of the popular iPhone, Apple report-
edly changed the size of the signal bars so that one bar of coverage in
the new interface appeared similar in overall size to two bars in the
old one.54  Others have explored how the contemporary practice of
matching the content Internet users see on the basis of their perceived
interests may lead to largely inadvertent side effects such as virtual
redlining or increased political polarization.55
Considering the concerns described above, it may be tempting for
one to believe that we have seen the full downside of consumer medi-
ation already?that mediation, as a phenomenon, has run its course.
The truth is that society is only beginning to understand how vast
asymmetries of information coupled with the unilateral power to de-
sign the legal and visual terms of the transaction could alter the con-
sumer landscape.  Three phenomenon, all intimately related to data,
threaten to dramatically accelerate data-informed marketing, and
hence the potential for market manipulation.  The first phenomenon
is the “mass production of bias” through big data; the second, the pos-
sibility of far greater consumer intelligence through “disclosure ratch-
ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB 271, 271–80 (2010), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1772719.  British user experience designer Harry Brignull refers to user interface designs that
work against the user as “dark patterns.” See DARK PATTERNS, http://darkpatterns.org (last vis-
ited Aug. 21, 2014).
52 See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks on the Measur-
ing Broadband America 2012 Report Presentation (July 19, 2012), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-315312A1.pdf.
53 Chris Harrison et al., Faster Progress Bars: Manipulating Perceived Duration with Visual
Augmentations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COM-
PUTING SYSTEMS 1545, 1545–48 (2010), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753556&
CFID=391340722&CFTOKEN=55472072 (finding new progress bar reduces perceived duration
by eleven percent in subjects).
54 Jesus Diaz, This Is How Much the New iPhone 4 Signal Bars Have Grown, GIZMODO
(July 15, 2010, 2:03 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5587535/this-is-how-much-the-new-iphone-4-sig-
nal-bars-have-grown (“Free tip: If you paint flames on the back of your iPhone 4, it runs 2.3x
faster.”).  Chances are Apple is using what it understands about the psychology of design to
substitute illusion for greater quality.  At the extremes, the ability to design an interface from
scratch means slot machines at a casino that create “near wins” to trigger the release of
dopamine by the gambler’s brain. See Luke Clark et al., Gambling Near-Misses Enhance Moti-
vation to Gamble and Recruit Win-Related Brain Circuitry, 61 NEURON 481, 481 (2009).
55 E.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 71–73 (2001); see also supra note 12 and accompa-
nying text.
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eting”; and the third, the move from ends-based to means-based ad
targeting and interface design.  Together, these phenomena begin to
leverage the full potential of consumer mediation in ways that con-
sumers and regulators can scarcely ignore.
A. The Mass Production of Bias
Herbert Simon coined the term “bounded rationality” in the
1950s to describe the limits people face in making consistently rational
decisions.56  Researchers in various disciplines have toiled for decades
to describe those limits in precise detail, testing and retesting for bias
in a variety of contexts.57  The basic structure of their toil is that of an
experimental study.  First, the experimenter will form a hypothesis as
to how subjects are likely to behave in response to a particular manip-
ulation.58  Second, the experimenter will test that hypothesis on some
number of subjects in a controlled study and, third, perhaps publish
the results.59  Early pioneers—Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler, and
others—generated their hypotheses from luck or intuition, revealing
one or two at a time the basic building blocks for behavioral econom-
ics.60  Many later studies merely reproduced their results in new con-
texts,61 while other scholars tested richly novel hypotheses.62
The result of behavioral economic research has been to generate
several dozen63 well-documented ways in which people deviate from
56 HERBERT A. SIMON, Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in MODELS OF
MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 196, 200–01 (1957).
57 See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behav-
ioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1150–51 & nn.30–32 (2001).
58 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
59 See, e.g., id. at 1124–25.
60 See, e.g., id.; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers,
76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 105–10 (1971) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Belief]; Amos Tver-
sky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453,
453–58 (1981).
61 See Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm, 55 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1099, 1100 (2011) (“The effect demonstrated by [Tversky and Kahneman], which the
two scholars labeled anchoring and adjustment, has been replicated using a wide variety of stim-
uli and participants.”).
62 E.g., Dan Ariely, Controlling the Information Flow: Effects on Consumers’ Decision
Making and Preferences, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 233, 233 (2000); George Loewenstein, Out of
Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996) (exploring effect of “visceral factors” such as hunger, thirst, and
sexual desire on decisionmaking).
63 The number of biases consistently discussed by the literature has remained relatively
stable since the field began. Compare Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–91 (1979) (discussing approxi-
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the rational pursuit of self-interest, including optimism bias, informa-
tion overload, anchoring, confirmation, and framing.64  Virtually every
bias, meanwhile, comes with a fairly neat (if sometimes contested) ex-
planation regarding the cause of the deviation—in other words, why
the person is making the “mistake” described.65  Explanatory candi-
dates include everything from prospect theory, involving the ways
people tend to weigh probability and assess risk,66 to dual process the-
ory (thinking “fast” and “slow”),67 to evolutionary biology.68  For ex-
ample, with evolutionary biology, Cliff Nass explained why we are
“wired” to treat computers as social actors when we know they are
just machines by noting that, when humans initially evolved, it was
socially advantageous to partner with other people and anything that
presented like a human likely was a human.69
Big data could change this equation.  More a way of conceiving of
problems and their solutions than a specific technique, big data’s
methods involve parsing very large data sets with powerful and subtle
algorithms in an effort to spot patterns.70  One classic, often-cited ex-
ample: imagine if a hospital system were to input all of its patients’
records in a huge database, including demographic information, what
medications they were taking, and their health outcomes.71  An aca-
demic researcher with access to this data could discover situations in
mately fifteen biases), with Ru¨diger F. Pohl, Introduction to COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HAND-
BOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 1, 1 (Ru¨diger F. Pohl
ed., 2004) (noting that collection surveys twenty-one “cognitive illusions”).  Varying definitions
of “bias,” as well as differing systems of categorization, may lead to very different estimates as to
the absolute number of known irrational tendencies.  Regardless of the total given in a specific
study or article, it is in no way near the many thousands this Section contemplates.
64 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 643–87 (reviewing behavioral economic
literature).
65 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 63, at 263–92.
66 See id. at 280–81; see also Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 41–43 (1980).
67 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
68 See, e.g., CLIFFORD NASS & SCOTT BRAVE, WIRED FOR SPEECH: HOW VOICE ACTI-
VATES AND ADVANCES THE HUMAN-COMPUTER RELATIONSHIP 3–4 (2005).
69 See id.; BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD NASS, THE MEDIA EQUATION: HOW PEOPLE
TREAT COMPUTERS, TELEVISION, AND NEW MEDIA LIKE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES 12 (1st
paperback ed. 1996).
70 For a more detailed definition of big data and an optimistic account of its impact on
society, see generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013). For a more
critical account, see generally Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data:
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. &
SOC’Y 662 (2012).
71 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 245–46 (2013).
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which particular populations—for example, black men over thirty-
five—were experiencing the same adverse symptoms while taking a
certain combination of medicines.72  Armed with this information, the
hospital could recommend to its physicians to prescribe something
else to this population, thereby improving health outcomes.73
Importantly, the hospital need not know why outcomes for thirty-
five-year-old black men on both drug A and B were poor to justify
investigating alternatives—maybe later tests will reveal the cause.  In
the interim, however, a significant enough negative correlation is
likely to speak for itself.74  Author and technology expert Chris An-
derson refers to this phenomenon as “the end of theory.”75  Anderson
sees a sea change in the way science is conducted, with scientists
pointing to raw numbers to advance research and policy goals, even in
the absence of a theoretical explanation for the raw data.76
Importantly, although the final data set that the hospital acted on
was in relation to a limited group of patients—thirty-five-year-old
black males—this does not mean that a computer analyzing the raw
data would have found the same pattern if it had only analyzed the
patient records of the thirty-five-year-old black males in isolation.  In
other words, if all the other patient records—those for children, wo-
men, white males, etc.—were removed.  It turns out that the hospital
needs all the data, not just the data about youngish black men, in or-
der to see the contours of the pattern.  Big data does not merely tune
out noise, in a sense it needs noise from which to make sound.77
Corporations, too, have scientists like the ones working for the
hospital.  A recent article in The Atlantic reports that Microsoft em-
ploys the second largest number of anthropologists after the United
States government.78  Many corporate scientists will probably con-
72 See id.
73 See id. But see Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 345 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-
Online-339.pdf (urging caution in overestimating the benefits of big data, relative to the poten-
tial harms).
74 See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 71, at 245–46.
75 See Chris Anderson, The End of Theory, WIRED, July 2008, at 108, 108–09.
76 See id. But see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920–22
(2013) (“Considered more soberly, the claim that Big Data will eliminate the need for scientific
modeling simply does not make sense.”).  Cohen’s concerns are largely ethically based. See id. at
1922–27.
77 That is to say that certain methods of analyzing data require a baseline against which to
measure deviation, as when spam filters look at normal email to identify junk. See, e.g., Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 71, at 245–46.
78 See Graeme Wood, Anthropology Inc., ATLANTIC, Mar. 2013, at 48, 51, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/03/anthropology-inc/309218/.
1010 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:995
tinue to be tasked with the old way of looking at consumer behavior:
controlled studies or focus groups that leverage the existing state of
the behavioral sciences.  For example, presumably Microsoft uses its
anthropologists to design better software and hardware.79  Increas-
ingly, however, firms are turning to big data to help them monetize
the enormous volume of information their businesses collect, gener-
ate, or buy.80  Moreover, one of the datasets to which firms have ac-
cess is consumer behavior.81
Trouble arises when firms start looking at the consumer behavior
dataset to identify consumer vulnerabilities.  Emerging methods of big
data present a new and vastly more efficient way to identify cognitive
bias by attempting to pinpoint profitable anomalies.82  Rather than hy-
pothesize and then test a promising deviation, as a lab experimenter
would, firms can work backward from raw data.83
To perform this backward-looking analysis from the data step,
this Article proposes that at least two very involved steps would be
required.  The first step would be to model what a consumer’s rational
choice would be in a given context: consumers taking every realistic
opportunity to maximize their own welfare.84  The second step would
be to analyze consumer transactions by the millions to spot the places
in which consumers deviated from the rational model created in the
first step.85  By identifying the factors related to these deviations, the
firm can watch for those factors to align again and target the con-
sumer when she is vulnerable.  The process is involved, but the payoff
is equally big: unless a few hundred researchers working indefinitely
can manage to spot every possible consumer bias, this big data process
will yield infinitely more ways in which consumers act irrationally.
Basically, big data means never having to “Ask Ariely” again.86
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., id.
81 See id. (describing “participant observation,” in which corporate anthropologists live
among research subjects in order to understand and use consumer behavior for the firm).
82 See, e.g., MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 66, at 54–61, 123–24 (explaining
advances in correlation analysis and describing how Decide.com spots and predicts deviations in
pricing).
83 See, e.g., id.
84 This process is similar to analyzing the patient records in the hospital illustration to find
the normal reaction to drugs A and B. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
85 Similar to identifying all the irregular reactions to drugs A and B through patient
records. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
86 See ASK ARIELY BLOG, http://www.danariely.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).  If the
result of the big data process is highly individualized, then why is this Section titled “mass pro-
duction” of bias?  Sometimes personalization is the upshot of mass production; for example,
when Henry Ford’s assembly lines displaced public transportation in favor of a car for each
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Modeling “rational” behavior through these two steps would be
difficult, and likely infeasible in the long run, because what is rational
for one consumer may not be rational for another.87  For instance, be-
cause a young investor may tolerate more risk than an older investor,
one would need to know the age of the investor, and likely many
other exogenous factors, to analyze whether her investments were
welfare-maximizing.  Several experts point out, however, that anom-
aly (sometimes “outlier”) detection would permit firms to (1) spot de-
viations from typical consumer behavior and (2) code the deviation as
helpful or harmful to the firm.88  Moreover, the firm could also gener-
ate individual models for each consumer and take a snapshot of the
circumstances in which the consumer behaved unexpectedly, and to
the firm’s advantage.
Not only may these techniques spot profitable deviations more
efficiently than laboratory studies, these methods may pinpoint other
significant information such as context dependency—identifying if the
deviation only occurs at particular times, in particular places, or
among particular consumers.89  Thus, there may be a bias or profitable
deviation that only occurs in the morning, in an airport, in the South,
or when the background of a website is orange.90  Furthermore, these
techniques may also spot overall prevalence.  In science, findings are
more meaningful when they pass the threshold of statistical signifi-
cance.91  In this context, statistical significance would indicate to firms
family. See Thomas J. Sugrue, From Motor City to Motor Metropolis: How the Automobile In-
dustry Reshaped Urban America, AUTOMOBILE AM. LIFE & SOC’Y, http://www.autolife.umd.
umich.edu/Race/R_Overview/R_Overview.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2014).
87 In recognizing a possible critique to this interview-based approach, Frank Easterbrook
took the occasion of an inaugural cyberlaw conference to point out that lawyers risk dilettantism
when they talk about technology.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (“I regret to report that no one at this Symposium is going to
win a Nobel Prize any time soon for advances in computer science.”).  What Easterbrook misses,
of course, is that lawyers can and do consult with professionals (e.g., expert witnesses) and col-
leagues in other disciplines.
88 See, e.g., Varun Chandola et al., Anomaly Detection: A Survey, ACM COMPUTING
SURVS., July 2009, at 15, 15:2 (“Anomaly detection finds extensive use in a wide variety of appli-
cations such as fraud detection for credit cards, insurance, or health care, intrusion detection for
cyber-security, fault detection in safety critical systems, and military surveillance for enemy ac-
tivities.”). See generally Animesh Patcha & Jung-Min Park, An Overview of Anomaly Detection
Techniques: Existing Solutions and Latest Technological Trends, 51 COMPUTER NETWORKS 3448
(2007) (surveying the anomaly detection literature in computer security context).
89 Cf. Quentin Hardy, Bizarre Insights From Big Data, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 28,
2012, 8:17 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/bizarre-insights-from-big-data/ (listing
revelations from pattern spotting in large datasets).
90 See, e.g., id.
91 See STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIF-
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when they can make money from the deviation.  Note again that the
algorithm that identifies the bias need not have to yield a theory as to
why it is happening to be useful.92  No psychologist or philosopher
need speculate as to why people are willing to pay more for silver
jewelry when there has been a recent power outage.  As long as the
firm can exploit the deviation for its benefit, the firm will not care.
B. Disclosure Ratcheting
Information has played various parts over the years in the story
of behavioral economics.  In some cases, information has been cast as
a villain.  As alluded to above, too much or extraneous information is
said to underlie a host of departures from rational decisionmaking.
For example, “information overload” causes consumers to rely on
heuristics or rules of thumb, shortcuts which are sometimes faulty.93
The phenomenon of “wear out,” which suggests consumers tune out
messages they see too often, renders product warnings less effective.94
Moreover, consumer perceptions change with the insertion of infor-
mation that should be irrelevant but is not treated as such by the
mind.95  Thus, as discussed above, early experiments in behavioral ec-
onomics show how a subject can be anchored to a particularly high or
low set of digits—say, a social security number—affecting later esti-
mates by the individual that are entirely unrelated to the anchor.96
Although it has played the role of villain, in other contexts, infor-
mation has also been cast as a hero.  Better information, delivered at
the right time, may counteract bias and help consumers make more
rational choices.97  A doctor might correct against optimism bias, for
instance, in the context of breast cancer by accompanying the relevant
statistic with an anecdote that renders the information more salient.98
ICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 1 (2008) (“For the
past eighty years it appears that some of the sciences have made a mistake by basing decisions on
statistical ‘significance.’”).
92 See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
93 See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1211–15 (1994) (describing the information overload phenomenon).
94 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 212 (describing “wear-out” as a phenomenon “in
which consumers learn to tune out messages that are repeated too often”).
95 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1128.
96 See id. (“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that
is adjusted to yield the final answer.”).
97 See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 199–200.
98 Optimism bias refers to the belief that one is somehow at less risk of experiencing a
negative outcome than the general population. Id. at 204.  The example of breast cancer risk
comes from the work of law and behavioral economics pioneers. See id. at 210.
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Many behavioral critiques of law end up recommending information-
based interventions.  To illustrate: a recent, exhaustive indictment of
the regulatory strategy of mandatory disclosure, though firmly
grounded in the limitations of consumers, firms, and officials to per-
form effective cost-benefit analyses, nevertheless ended on a positive
note regarding the power of “advice.”99  Another example is the con-
cept of “visceral notice”—notice that is experienced instead of heard
or read—as a viable alternative to today’s inadequate disclosure re-
gimes.100  The authors of the best-selling book Nudge, Thaler and Sun-
stein, also rely heavily on information strategies—particularly
“feedback” and “mapping”—in their bid to find middle ground be-
tween paternalism and laissez-faire.101
Most recently, scholars have begun to cast information as the vic-
tim.  Researchers and others have realized that people’s biases lead
them to give up more personal information than they would absent
the manipulation.102  A simple example is defaults: if consumers must
opt out of data collection instead of opt in, more data will end up
being collected as consumers hold to the status quo.103  The endow-
ment effect furnishes a more complex example: people value their pri-
vacy more if they already have it than if they must acquire it, and will
pay more to protect information from a third party than they will ac-
cept to sell it.104
To expand on the premise of information as the victim, behav-
ioral economists focusing on privacy issues—particularly Alessandro
Acquisti and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon—chronicle how
knowledge of bias and design psychology make it possible to modu-
late the amount of information that people are willing to disclose dur-
ing experimental studies.105  One experiment suggests that making a
99 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 746 (2011).
100 See generally Calo, supra note 20, at 1027.
101 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6–8 (where “Humans” refers to actual peo-
ple, as opposed to the perfectly rational “Econs” that populate traditional economic models).
102 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics
Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363,
363–79 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008).
103 There is a revealing set of graphs in a 2012 communications paper showing how per-
sonal disclosure on the social network Facebook was trending fairly sharply downward until,
around 2009, the company changed some of its privacy defaults. See Fred Stutzman et al., Silent
Listeners: The Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTI-
ALITY, no. 2, 2012, at 7, 17, http://repository.cmu.edu/jpc/vol4/iss2/2/.  From that point on, disclo-
sure began steadily to climb again. See id.
104 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 102, at 363–79.
105 See id.
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website more casual in appearance, as opposed to formal, makes sub-
jects more likely to admit to controversial behavior such as cheating
or drug use.106  Another study shows, ironically, that giving consumers
more apparent control over how their information is used will lead to
more promiscuous disclosure behavior (just as seat belts have been
alleged to lead to more aggressive driving).107  Yet other experiments
have evidenced the manner in which reciprocity—the questioner of-
fering up information first—increases the likelihood that a subject will
answer a personal question, even when the questioner is a com-
puter.108  For example, the computer might begin with, “I was made in
2007,” before prompting the subject with the question, “When were
you born?”109
If one examines the data of any of these studies closely, however,
she will see that there are subjects for whom the effect is nil.  Not
everyone is more likely to admit to cheating on a test if the website is
casual in appearance; others are very likely to do so.110  Everyone has
cognitive biases, but not everyone has the same biases or experiences
them to the same degree.111  Anchoring may have a great effect on
one individual and none on another.  One person may be abnormally
intolerant of information overload whereas another can read an entire
law review article like this one in a single sitting.
All of these observations are testable.  For example, a study could
prime the subject with a high number and then ask for the subject to
estimate the population of France; later, the same study could prime
the subject with a low number and ask for an estimation of the popu-
lation of England.  Assuming proper controls, the study would reveal
the extent of the subject’s anchoring bias relative to other partici-
pants.112  Furthermore, experiments could attempt to use general bi-
ases to get at specific bias more directly.  One of the things individuals
106 See Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Di-
vulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858, 863–68 (2011).
107 Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, 4
SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 340, 340–47 (2013).
108 See, e.g., B.J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, How Users Reciprocate to Consumers: An Experi-
ment That Demonstrates Behavior Change, in CHI ’97 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FAC-
TORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 331, 331–32 (1997), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1120419&CFID=391340722&CFTOKEN=55472072; S. Parise et al., Cooperating with Life-Like
Interface Agents, 15 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 123, 123–42 (1999).
109 See, e.g., Parise et al., supra note 108, at 130–31.
110 See John et al., supra note 106, at 863–68; see also Brandimarte et al., supra note 107, at
340–47.
111 See, e.g., John et al., supra note 106, at 863–68.
112 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1128–30.
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might be nudged into disclosing about themselves, perhaps inadver-
tently, is the set of biases that most profoundly afflict them.  Imagine
that our friendly computer poses this question instead: “I tend to be
optimistic about life; how about you?”  Or imagine if the casual design
condition of an experiment eschewed controversial behavior such as
cheating or illegally downloading music in favor of the subject’s fears
or impulsivities.113
Meanwhile, a large company, operating at scale, is not limited by
the forms and formalities of laboratories.  Companies can—through
A/B testing—experiment on thousands of consumers at once.114
Through the use of methods such as sweepstakes, a company might
have the resources to try to incentivize consumers to answer questions
about themselves and the capacity to track those consumers over time.
Such a company might treat the possibility of leveraging consumer
bias to increase self-disclosure as only the first step in the process of
cultivating information.  The next step would be to use what it learned
as a means to discover more.  Or, alternatively, the firm could sell a
list of consumers with a particular bias to the highest bidder115—a tac-
tic that this Article labels disclosure “ratcheting”—which could result
in even greater data promiscuity than what society experiences today.
C. Means-Based Targeting
Does “behavioral targeting” already exist in advertising?  Read-
ing the headlines and op-eds, it would seem that companies are track-
ing a web user’s every click, and using this information, alone or in
combination, to serve eerily personalized online ads already.116  And
this phenomenon is not just online: increasingly, companies are mak-
113 Cf. Fogg & Nass, supra note 108, at 331–32; Parise et al., supra note 108, at 123–42.
114 A/B testing refers to the iterative method of using randomized controlled experiments
to design user interfaces, products, and ads.  The idea is to present the subject-consumer with the
existing design (control) and a variation (treatment) and measure any differences in behavior.
Multivariate or “bucket” testing presents subject-consumers with several iterations at once.  For
an in-depth look at the rise of A/B testing, see Brian Christian, The A/B Test, WIRED, May 2012,
at 176.
115 One can already buy so-called “sucker lists” on the open market.  These are people?the
elderly, for instance?who analysts have classified as vulnerable. See Karen Blumenthal, How
Banks, Marketers Aid Scams, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2009, at D3.
116 The “What They Know” series from The Wall Street Journal has, in particular, illus-
trated the extent of online tracking.  This section of The Wall Street Journal’s website collects all
articles and information related to privacy concerns and tracking information. What They Know,
WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-know-digital-privacy.html (last visited
Aug. 21, 2014).  For a more specific example, see Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Jeremy Singer-
Vine, They Know What You’re Shopping For, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424127887324784404578143144132736214.
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ing connections between consumers’ online and offline behavior and
building interest profiles that combine both data sets.117  Less noticed
is how the techniques that were developed to make the Internet more
competitive relative to larger markets such as television—specifically,
the ability to target ads coupled with better analytics—have filtered to
the offline world.118  Today, some offline businesses follow consumers
around the mall using their cell phone signals or other methods similar
to the way online businesses track online users.119  Consumers cur-
rently live in a world in which television commercials differ by house-
hold and billboards change with the radio habits of drivers.120
For all its talk of behavior, however, digital advertising today is
really about relevance—matching the right advertisement with the
right person.  Online advertising networks have an inventory of ads,
and, especially given competition from other media, they want to
make sure each “impression” (display of an ad) is not wasted on a
person who would never click on it.121  The bulk of the tracking that
one reads about goes to determining the likely preferences of a given
consumer so as to show her the product or service, the ad for which is
already in inventory, that seems the most likely to resonate.122  In
other words, the “behavioral” in behavioral tracking refers to the pre-
vious behavior of the user online, which then serves to sort that user
into a particular category for ad-matching purposes.123
Relevance is, however, turning out to be a mere phase in adver-
tising’s evolution.  Researchers like Maurits Kaptein look beyond
matching the right ad to the right person.124  Rather, for any given ad,
117 See TUROW, NICHE ENVY, supra note 10, at 18 (“Major developments in the use of
database marketing at the retail level are paralleling the developments in digital media . . . .”).
118 See, e.g., Keith Wagstaff, Will Your Mall Be Tracking Your Cellphone Today?, TIME
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/11/25/will-your-mall-be-tracking-your-cellphone-
today/.
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., Robert Salladay, High-Tech Billboards Tune In to Drivers’ Tastes: Roadside
Signs Coming to Bay Area Listen to Car Radios, Then Adjust Pitch, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2002,
at A1.
121 See Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided
Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 60 (2012).
122 The industry calls this practice “interest-based advertising.” See NETWORK ADVER. INI-
TIATIVE, 2013 NAI CODE OF CONDUCT 9 (2013), available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/
2013_Principles.pdf.
123 See generally Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July
31–Aug. 1, 2010, at W1.
124 See generally Maurits Kaptein & Steven Duplinsky, Combining Multiple Influence Strat-
egies to Increase Consumer Compliance, 8 INT’L J. INTERNET MARKETING & ADVERTISING 32,
33–51 (2013); Maurits Kaptein & Dean Eckles, Heterogeneity in the Effects of Online Persuasion,
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the techniques these researchers are investigating would find the exact
right pitch for that person.125  This new research starts from the pre-
mise, discussed above, that consumers differ in their susceptibility to
various forms of persuasion.  Some consumers, for instance, respond
to consensus.126  Others bristle at following the herd but instead find
themselves reacting to scarcity or another frame.127  Kaptein and his
colleagues show that companies can discover what motivates a given
consumer and dynamically change the advertisement accordingly in
real time—a technique called persuasion profiling.128  Therefore, for
the natural follower, the ad for toothpaste will refer to it as a “best
selling” item.129  Whereas, for the scarcity-phobic, the same ad will
ominously read “while supplies last.”130
To supplement the concerns raised by the persuasion profiling
line of studies, a distinct line of research recognizes that consumers
have different “cognitive styles,” or ways of thinking and engaging
with the world.131  Some people are “impulsive,” for instance, others
“deliberative.”132  Some think visually whereas others really need to
read text.133  Accordingly, most websites will resonate more with some
users than with others.134  These researchers—among them John
Hauser and Glen Urban—develop ways to test the subject’s cognitive
style and then dynamically alter the layout of the test website accord-
ingly—a technique they label “morphing.”135  The research looks at
various factors such as when to morph and whether repeated morphs
26 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING, 176, 176–88 (2012); Maurits Kaptein et al., Means Based Adap-
tive Persuasive Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 335–44 (2011), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1978990. See
also Yin-Hui Cheng et al., The Effect of Companion’s Gender on Impulsive Purchasing: The
Moderating Factor of Cohesiveness and Susceptibility to Interpersonal Influence, 43 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 227, 227–36 (2013).
125 See Kaptein & Eckles, supra note 124, at 179–83.
126 See id. at 177.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 187; see also Maurits Kaptein & Dean Eckles, Selecting Effective Means to Any
End: Futures and Ethics of Persuasion Profiling, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY 82, 82–93 (Thomas Ploug et al. eds., 2010), availa-
ble at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2164027.
129 See Kaptein & Eckles, supra note 124, at 177.
130 Id.




134 See id. at 202.
135 See id.
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are worthwhile.136  There is, of course, an argument that this is just
good web design—websites that morph to each user are likely to be
more “usable.”  The trouble is that the measure of success is not wide-
spread accessibility.  Success is measured, again, by the likelihood of a
sale.137
In short, the consumer of the future will be increasingly medi-
ated, and the firm of the future increasingly empowered to capitalize
on that mediation in ways both fair and suspect.  A firm with the re-
sources and inclination will be in a position to surface and exploit how
consumers tend to deviate from rational decisionmaking on a previ-
ously unimaginable scale.  Thus, firms will increasingly be in the posi-
tion to create suckers, rather than waiting for one to be born.  But is
this really a problem?  And if so, what do we do about it?  The next
two Parts tackle these questions in turn.
III. A RESPONSE TO SKEPTICS
In his 1997 book Fear of Persuasion, John Calfee offers a new
perspective on advertising and regulation.138  Regardless of the title,
Calfee’s perspective is actually an old one: we should not regulate ad-
vertising.139  Indeed, skeptics, like Calfee, have met each wave of per-
suasion panic with a variety of often sensible and compelling
critiques.140  Such skeptics might ask whether a change has readily oc-
curred—either because the new technique does not work “as adver-
tised,” or because it is actually indistinguishable from accepted
practice.141  Skeptics also question whether there is any real harm to
how marketing has evolved, while noting that regulation will not be
possible without hurting the economy or offending free speech.142
136 Id. at 207–09.
137 See id. at 211.
138 JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING AND
REGULATION (1997).
139 Id. at 86–95 (advocating industry self-regulation).
140 See, e.g., John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from
the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 246–50 (1994); Dean K. Cherchiglia, Note,
Changing Channels in Broadcast Regulation: Leaving Television Advertising to Containment by
Market Forces, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 465, 465–70 (1984).
141 For example, some question whether contemporary advertising is effective at generating
demand at all—though this claim seems to be in tension with contemporary advertising’s pur-
ported benefits and the sheer amount of money that is spent on marketing. See Tamara R. Piety,
“A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 19 n.102
(2012).
142 See, e.g., CALFEE, supra note 138, at 110 (“Hence advertising regulation has an inherent
tendency to go too far—just like censorship of political and artistic speech does.”); see also infra
Part III.C.
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This Part anticipates and addresses similar skepticism against dig-
ital market manipulation.  Section A responds to the argument that
digital market manipulation represents at most a quantitative change
from the practices already described by Hanson, Kysar, and others.
Maybe the new techniques will be a little more effective, and there-
fore occur more often, but what is happening is not different in kind.
Section B deals with the claim that, even if we believe digital market
manipulation differs from what came before, that does not mean that
it generates any real harm.  Addressing this critique is particularly im-
portant because harm tends to be a threshold question for consumer
regulation (e.g., under the FTC’s unfairness standard) and litigation.143
Finally, Section C ends with a detailed analysis of whether, new or
not, harmful or not, digital market manipulation can actually be regu-
lated consistent with the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.
There is a more basic threshold question, however, before ad-
dressing any of the enumerated critiques: Will firms actually engage in
digital market manipulation in the first place?  Will the existing state
of technology, coupled with evolving techniques of data mining and
design, actually translate into the practices this Article has described?
Hanson and Kysar accompanied their work with an article devoted to
evidencing the phenomenon of market manipulation.144  Although this
Article speculates to a degree, there are early signs.
A recent patent filed by Pitney Bowes—a 5.3 billion dollar com-
pany with 29,000 employees—describes a “system and method for
generating targeted advertising that utilizes behavioral economics
marketing experts to generate advertising.”145  Some researchers in-
volved in experiments like the ones described in this Part have since
been hired by companies whose lifeblood is digital advertising.146
143 See Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070, 1073 (1984) (FTC Policy Statement
on Unfairness) (“To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.  It must be
substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competi-
tion that the practice produces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not
reasonably have avoided.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392–95 (2009) (discussing how emotional distress
torts often founder on damages).
144 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1424–25.
145 Method & Sys. for Creating Targeted Adver. Utilizing Behav. Econ. Mktg. Experts,
U.S. Patent Application No. 13/353,529 (filed Jan. 19, 2012) (Pitney Bowes Inc., assignee).
146 For instance, Dean Eckles, co-author of several papers on persuasion profiling, now
works on the “data science team” of the social network Facebook. See Dean Eckles, Curriculum
Vitae, available at http://deaneckles.com/Dean_Eckles_CV.pdf.  Of course, this does not mean
that Facebook is using the technique, nor that the motivation behind Eckles’ academic work is in
any way suspect.  Eckles appears aware of the potential for unethical use of the techniques he
helped pioneer. See Kaptein & Eckles, supra note 128, at 82–93.
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Moreover, as previously discussed, unscrupulous firms already trade
“sucker” lists of vulnerable consumers.147  If this Article is correct
about the basic feasibility of the techniques addressed in Part II, then
the strongest argument that this change is emerging relates to eco-
nomic motivation.  Traditional market manipulation affects transac-
tions only incrementally, so the incentives on the part of firms to
adopt it are limited.  It serves to reason that, as it becomes more pow-
erful, digital market manipulation will also be more attractive to firms,
particularly where they face competition from those with fewer
qualms.148
A. There Is Nothing New Here
“What has been is what will be, and what has been done is
what will be done, and there is nothing new under the sun.”149
People have been denouncing selling for generations.  Sometimes
vehemently; for example Mark Twain once wrote a letter to a snake
oil salesman expressing his hope that the “patent medicine assassin[ ]”
would “take a dose of [his] own poison by mistake.”150  Every decade
or so, a popular book, study, or article sounds the alarm over develop-
ments in marketing.151  Whatever the particular state of art or science,
sellers are going to do what they have always done: try to persuade.
Digital market manipulation is a problem, if at all, because it consti-
tutes a form of persuasion that is dangerous to consumers or society.
A skeptic may say that digital market manipulation does not actually
increase the danger.  It does not differ from other marketing practices
that, for instance, leverage what firms think they know about con-
sumer psychology?at least not in a way the law can operationalize.
147 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
148 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17, at 726 (“[M]anipulation of consumers by manufac-
turers is not simply a possibility in light of the behavioral research but . . . an inevitable result of
the competitive market.”).
149 Ecclesiastes 1:9.
150 Letter from Mark Twain to J.H. Todd (Nov. 20, 1905), available at http://www.letter-
sofnote.com/2010/01/youre-idiot-of-33rd-degree.html.
151 See, e.g., WILSON BRYAN KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION: AD MEDIA’S MANIPULATION
OF A NOT SO INNOCENT AMERICA 1–5 (Signet 1974) (describing subliminal techniques of adver-
tising); WILSON BRYAN KEY, THE AGE OF MANIPULATION: THE CON IN CONFIDENCE, THE SIN
IN SINCERE 7–34 (Madison Books 1992) (describing subliminal techniques of advertising); SUSAN
LINN, CONSUMING KIDS: THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF CHILDHOOD 1–10 (2004) (criticizing prac-
tices of marketing to children); PACKARD, supra note 7, at 1–7 (criticizing the ascendance of
“depth marketing”); PARISER, supra note 10, at 14–18 (criticizing the “filter bubble”); TUROW,
THE DAILY YOU, supra note 10, at 88–110 (criticizing the sorting of consumers into “targets” or
“waste”).
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This Article draws an important distinction: digital market ma-
nipulation combines, for the first time, a certain kind of personaliza-
tion with the intense systemization made possible by mediated
consumption.  Obviously some pitches and advertisements can be per-
sonalized even outside the world of mediated consumption—a good
salesperson will get a sense of her customer.  The brand of the cus-
tomer’s watch may tell the salesperson what the customer can afford
to pay, and the customer’s way of talking may reveal his level of intel-
ligence.  With these observations, the salesperson can alter her presen-
tation accordingly.  An aggressive salesperson may even detect a
certain bias or vulnerability in the customer and attempt to exploit
it.152
Meanwhile, much of marketing is heavily systematized.  Auto-
mated or semiautomated commercial speech dwarfs regular and elec-
tronic mail.153  Robots call at all hours.154  Today’s online advertising
platforms match hundreds of thousands of ads with millions of In-
ternet users on the basis of complex factors in a fraction of a second.155
What society has not seen, at least not at scale, is the combination
of both these realms—the systemization of the personal.  In normal
consumer interactions, the salesperson faces limits.  She can only con-
trol certain facets of the interaction, for instance.  She cannot change
the environment to conform to the consumer’s particular cognitive
style.  Lacking a digital interface, she cannot spontaneously alter her
own appearance to increase trust.  She has access to limited informa-
tion—often what the consumer consciously and unconsciously reveals
through appearance and speech.
Like the salesperson, today’s online advertising platforms also
face limits.  Being primarily “ends-based,” online advertisers hope
152 See Jessica M. Choplin et al., A Psychological Investigation of Consumer Vulnerability to
Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (“We hypothesize
that when unscrupulous salespeople, including mortgage brokers and lenders, reassure consum-
ers and explain away ‘problematic’ contract terms (i.e., terms inconsistent with what was previ-
ously promised and against the consumer’s interest), many consumers will acquiesce to the
problematic terms.”); Wenxia Guo & Kelley J. Main, The Vulnerability of Defensiveness: The
Impact of Persuasion Attempts and Processing Motivations on Trust, 23 MARKETING LETTERS
959, 962 (2012) (describing how a clever salesperson can exploit a consumer’s very defensiveness
to increase the likelihood of a sale).
153 See Debin Liu, The Economics of Proof-of-Work, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
335, 336 (2007) (describing prevalence and mechanisms of spam).
154 See Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound of, or a
Threat to, Democracy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 213, 214–17 (2009) (describing
the prevalence and mechanisms of automated or “robo” calls).
155 See Warner & Sloan, supra note 121, at 57–59 (describing the industry).
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they have matched the right ad to the right person.156  The content of
the ads can leverage only what firms know about consumer frailty in
general (e.g., that many perceive $9.99 as closer to $9 than to $10157)
or, at most, the vulnerabilities firms know for a particular segment of
the population (e.g., that children prefer bulbous to angular shapes158).
Online retailers can change the digital environment of transactions,
but absent the emerging techniques this Article addresses, retailers
must do so all at once and for everyone.159  Accordingly, every change
loses some set of consumers whose cognitive style, bias, reservation
price, or other idiosyncrasy is not represented.160
The systemization of the personal may prove different enough
from prior selling practices that regulators or courts will seek limits on
digital market manipulation, even if they would be hesitant to curtail
age-old sales practices like interpersonal flattery.  Or, at the very least,
digital market manipulation may just feel different enough to justify
intervention.161  Even if one accepts that the systemization of the per-
sonal differs in kind from previous selling practices, however, which
specific digital market manipulation practices the law should constrain
remains unclear.  It would be strange to say, for instance, that a web-
site that changed on the basis of the language or visual acuity of the
individual user in order to make the website more accessible should
be penalized.  Firms have incentives to look for ways to exploit con-
sumers, but they also have powerful incentives to look for ways to
help and delight them.
This concern calls for a limiting principle: regulators and courts
should only intervene where it is clear that the incentives of firms and
156 See supra Part II.C.
157 Hanson and Kysar call this phenomenon “price blindness.”  Hanson & Kysar, supra
note 16, at 1441–42.
158 See generally LINN, supra note 151 (describing the use of child psychology in
advertising).
159 See supra Part II.C.
160 See supra Part II.C.  This is not to say that there cannot be abuses.  As alluded to above,
the Federal Trade Commission has brought a complaint against a company that coupled mislead-
ing website design with techniques of negative option marketing. See supra note 30 and accom-
panying text.
161 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler discuss how a “severe departure from the reference transac-
tion” can lead to official intervention even if such intervention does not maximize welfare.  Jolls
et al., supra note 18, at 1510–17.  The authors use the practice of scalping tickets to an event as
one such example. Id. at 1513; see also M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29–33 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-cata-
lyst (arguing that society’s visceral reaction to surveillance drones may change privacy law in
ways that previous, readily analogous technologies did not).
2014] DIGITAL MARKET MANIPULATION 1023
consumers are not aligned.162  It is the systemization of the personal
coupled with divergent interests that should raise a red flag.  There are
several areas of law from which to draw analogies.  Consider a simple
example: so-called “buyer agents” in real estate.163  People selling
houses typically employ agents who are paid a commission.164  Those
agents often work with other agents to help find buyers and will split
the commission.165  Buyer agents hold many advantages relative to
buyers: they know the overall housing market; they know detailed fi-
nancial information about the buyer, including the price they can af-
ford; and they know more about the seller’s situation than the buyer
through interacting directly with the seller agent.166  Meanwhile, the
incentives of the buyer agent and those of the buyer are in a critical
sense opposite: the buyer wants to pay as little as possible, whereas
the buyer agent wants the buyer to pay as much as possible in order to
maximize his commission.167  In the face of this imbalance and incen-
tive structure, some jurisdictions impose upon buyer agents a duty of
fair dealing toward the buyer.168
Of course, this raises yet a further question: when are the incen-
tives between firms and consumers “aligned” and when are they not?
The incentives of healthcare providers and patients, for instance, are
fairly clearly aligned where analyzing drug prescriptions yields previ-
ously unknown counter-indications.  Few hospitals or patients want
the patients to suffer or die.  What about the incentives of consumers
and a website when the website displays ads that are more relevant to
the consumer’s interests?  Some individuals might say that the con-
sumer’s and the firm’s interest were aligned in this context, while
other would disagree.  But true digital market manipulation, like mar-
ket manipulation in general, deals strictly in divergent incentives.  The
entire point is to leverage the gap between how a consumer pursuing
her self-interest would behave leading up to the transaction and how
an actual consumer with predictable flaws behaves when pushed, spe-
cifically so as to extract social surplus.169  For example, imagine a firm
162 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 1443–44 (discussing the role of incentives in the context
of puffery).
163 See Brent T. White, Walking Away Scot-Free: Trust, Expert Advice, and Realtor Respon-
sibility, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 312, 316–320 (2011) (describing the role of a buyers agent in detail).
164 See id. at 315–16.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 318–19.
167 See id. at 319.
168 See Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to
Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 957 (1987).
169 See supra Part I.
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that changes the price of flowers because it knows this purchaser will
pay more because she just had a fight with her spouse.  The purchaser
would obviously rather pay less.
Under this limiting principle, there will undoubtedly exist plenty
of border cases or de minimis infractions with which regulators and
courts will have to grapple.  Still, this is nothing the law has not seen
before.  Courts and legislatures have to decide what makes a contract
term “unconscionable,”170 what kinds of enrichments are “unjust,”171
when influence is “undue,”172 what constitutes “fair dealing,”173 when
strategic behavior becomes “bad faith,”174 when interest rates become
“usury,”175 and on and on.  Line drawing is endemic to consumer pro-
tection and other areas of the law concerned with basic notions of fair
play.
B. No Harm, No Foul
Business techniques and patterns of consumption change all of
the time; not every change, however, occasions regulation.  The mar-
ket has winners and losers.  Thus, the mere fact of advantage, without
more, does not justify intervention.  One way to sort which changes
deserve scrutiny and which do not is to look for harm.176  Like is the
case with line drawing generally, courts look for harm rou-
tinely?damages being an element of almost all torts and some
crimes.177  Regulators look for harm as well, as the FTC requires harm
to proceed with a claim of unfairness under section 5of its animating
statute.178
What, exactly, is the harm of serving an ad to a consumer that is
based on her face or that plays to her biases?  The skeptic may see
none.  This Section makes the case that digital market manipulation,
170 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1663–64 (9th ed. 2009).
171 Id. at 1678.
172 Id. at 1666.
173 Id. at 675.
174 Id. at 159.
175 Id. at 1685.
176 The idea that harm should be a threshold question in law is a staple of Western political
thought. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (2d ed. 1859) (“[T]he only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
177 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C) (2012) (“[A]nd as a result of such conduct, causes
damage and loss.”); see also Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625–26 (2004) (remarking on the intent
of Congress to “avoid[ ] giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than ‘abstract injuries’” (quot-
ing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983))).
178 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
2014] DIGITAL MARKET MANIPULATION 1025
as defined in this Article, has the potential to generate economic and
privacy harms and to damage consumer autonomy in a very specific
way.
1. Economic harm
Hanson and Kysar argue that market manipulation should be un-
derstood as a novel source of market failure because the practice leads
to inefficient or otherwise objectionable economic outcomes.179  As a
case study, the authors explore the product liability field.180  In this
context, Hanson and Kysar point to the example of a firm that
manipulates a consumer to underestimate the risks of a given product,
as well as to the harder case of the firm manipulating the consumer to
demand more of a risky product than is optimal.181  Thus, for example,
the authors suggest that gun manufacturers may be playing down the
dangers of accidental shooting while playing up the risks of attack,
particularly to segments of the population who feel vulnerable.182  In
reality, the authors maintain, accidental death by shooting is the
greater threat.183
Digital market manipulation only accelerates Hanson and Kysar’s
concerns.  Generally speaking, the techniques described in the Article
up until now may lead to excessive consumption of junk food, ciga-
rettes, and other so-called demerit goods—a reasonably well-theo-
rized harm.184  The harder question, perhaps, is what happens in
situations where digital market manipulation merely results in the
greater extraction of rent during transactions the consumer would
have made anyway, or else results in the additional purchase of a good
like bottled water that is not intrinsically harmful.  The intuition of
many economists around dynamic price discrimination (and perhaps
persuasion profiling) would be to remark that these techniques are
179 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1425 (“We believe that this problem of market ma-
nipulation represents a previously unrecognized threat to markets’ allocative efficiency—a new
source of market failure.”).
180 See id. (noting that the paper provides evidence that “manufacturers do manipulate
consumer perceptions and preferences, consistent with the hunches of early products liability
scholars”). See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 17.
181 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1459–60, 1463 (“We could provide many more exam-
ples.  In each case, manufacturers are apparently attempting to dull consumer perceptions of the
environmental risks posed by their products.”).
182 Id. at 1463.
183 Id. at 1464.
184 See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 452–53 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).  Merit goods are goods authorities want
to see greater consumption of; demerit goods are goods that should be consumed less. See id.
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not inefficient merely because the party with the greater information
and power extracts the social surplus.185
Relatively mainstream economic arguments point to yet another
way in which digital market manipulation causes or exacerbates eco-
nomic harms.  In his 2012 book Seduction by Contract: Law, Econom-
ics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets, Oren Bar-Gill explores the
systematic application of behavioral economics to the drafting of con-
tracts.186  Using various case studies (credit cards, mortgages, and cell
phones), Bar-Gill concludes that behaviorally informed drafting tech-
niques, largely by virtue of the complexity they introduce, hinder or
distort competition and impose an outsized burden on the least so-
phisticated consumers.187  Similarly, Russell Korobkin argues that
courts should expand the role of unconscionability in contracts where
drafts exploit bounded rationality.188  Furthermore, the work of math-
ematician Andrew Odlyzko strongly suggests unhealthy effects of dy-
namic price discrimination.189  Digital market manipulation could even
lead to regressive distribution effects—another recognized symptom
of market failure—by systematically leveraging knowledge about the
sophistication and resources of each consumer.190
Of course, the picture will be mixed: some consumers could, in
theory, be charged less because of a smaller willingness to pay.  Con-
185 See, e.g., LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 1 (1983)
(“[G]enerally, discriminatory prices [are] required for an optimal allocation of resources in real
life situations.” (emphasis omitted)).
186 See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSY-
CHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012).
187 Id. at 1–3.  Several techniques of digital market manipulation, particularly disclosure
ratcheting, would also tend to exacerbate information asymmetries that can distort terms or even
preclude mutually beneficial transactions from taking place. See supra Part II.B.  Writing
around the same time as Bar-Gill, however, Scott Peppet sees the advent of “augmented reality”
as providing something of a corrective to the problems Bar-Gill identifies: consumers are in-
creasingly able to compare price, quality, and other terms in real-time, leading to potentially
greater freedom in contracting. See Peppet, supra note 48, at 679–80.
188 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1234–35, 1290, 1294 (2003); see also Woodrow Hartzog,
Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1664 (2011) (noting that the very design of
a website might be frustrating enough to consumer choice as to be deemed unconscionable).
189 See, e.g., Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the In-
ternet, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 187, 208 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds.,
2004).
190 Cf. Amanda Conley & Laura Moy, Paying the Wealthy for Being Wealthy: Why We
Should Care About Information Privacy Even If We Have “Nothing to Hide” (July 25, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with The George Washington Law Review) (arguing that price
and offer discrimination may exacerbate economic inequality).  Moy and Conley arguably go too
far; economic inequality is a complex phenomenon with many causes.  Still, the authors make an
interesting point.
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sider for a moment that there is nothing inefficient per se in mass pro-
ducing biases, ratcheting up personal disclosure, and using the
resulting data to alter user experiences in ways advantageous to the
firm.  There are nevertheless likely to be costs associated with avoid-
ing this process.191  It stands to reason that a subset of consumers will
eventually become aware of the possibility of digital market manipula-
tion and develop strategies to avoid or even game its constituent tech-
niques.  Such behavior generates transaction costs—otherwise
unnecessary expenditures of resources.192  Consumers may spend time
and money, for instance, hiding their identity or browsing the same
website at different times or with different browsers in order to com-
pare price or even to avoid creepy ads.193  Thus, at a minimum, digital
market manipulation would occasion behavior by one or more market
participants that generates externalities and decreases overall market
efficiency.
2. Privacy harm
Imagine a consumer traveling to Amazon.com for the first time.
Amazon, the online retailing giant, places a file on the consumer’s
computer of which the consumer is not aware.  The purpose of this
hidden file is to track how many times the consumer visits Amazon’s
website.194  Each time the consumer visits, the fact of the visit (among
other things) gets stored on an Amazon server.  After a certain num-
ber of visits, and again unbeknownst to the consumer, Amazon de-
cides that the consumer must be a regular customer.  As a
consequence, Amazon starts to charge the consumer higher prices for
the same products.195  The consumer can choose to buy the goods or
191 Cf. infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text (discussing avoidance surveillance and
privacy costs); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 10, at 2030 (describing steps sophisticated con-
sumers may take to thwart price discrimination).  This point developed in conversation with
Christopher Yoo and Alessandro Acquisti.
192 See Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1327, 1328–29 (2012) (discussing how consumers’ expectations of social networking services re-
sult in unanticipated costs after joining such a service).
193 See, e.g., Caveat Emptor.com, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2012, at 12 (canvassing steps con-
sumers can take to avoid dynamic price discrimination).
194 See Amazon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/cus-
tomer/display.html?nodeId=468496 (last updated Mar. 3, 2014) (“We receive and store certain
types of information whenever you interact with us.  For example, like many Web sites, we use
‘cookies,’ and we obtain certain types of information when your Web browser accesses Ama-
zon.com or advertisements and other content served by or on behalf of Amazon.com on other
Web sites.”).
195 Amazon actually implemented such a practice for a brief time in 2000. See JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 204 (2008).  More recently, The
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not at the new price.  Despite the consumer’s choice, what is the im-
pact on her privacy?
Distilling privacy harm is famously difficult.196  Privacy harm
reduces down, in most cases, to whatever negative consequences flow
from a privacy violation.197  The question of what constitutes a privacy
violation is generally tied to control over personal information, with
the logical consequence that increased collection and processing of
data is usually linked to a greater privacy threat.198  From this perspec-
tive, a practice such as disclosure ratcheting will be problematic to the
extent it is capable of overcoming consumer resistance to self-disclo-
sure.  The ability to extract more data from consumers exacerbates
whatever one thinks of as the consequence of lack of control over
information.199
A previous article offers a relatively rigorous theory of privacy
harm that, while idiosyncratic, captures the privacy issues that arise at
the intersection of behavioral economics and big data.200  This theory
holds that privacy harm is comprised of two distinct but interrelated
categories.201  The first category is subjective in that it is internal to the
person experiencing the harm.202  In this context, subjective privacy
harm is the perception of unwanted observation, in other words the
unwelcome mental states such as anxiety or embarrassment that ac-
company the belief of an individual (or group) that he is being
watched or monitored.203
The second element is objective in the sense of involving external
forces being brought to bear against a person or group because of
Wall Street Journal has uncovered extensive evidence of offers and prices changing from user to
user by other companies. See Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals
Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, at A1.
196 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088–93 (2002)
(canvassing theories of privacy harm and finding every single one either over- or under-
inclusive).
197 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132
(2011).
198 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468
(2000) (“Privacy-destroying technologies can be divided into two categories: those that facilitate
the acquisition of raw data and those that allow one to process and collate that data in interest-
ing ways.”).
199 See Paul M. Schwartz, Commentary, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV.
815, 820 (2000) (“The leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or off-line world, con-
ceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one’s data.”).
200 See generally Calo, supra note 197.
201 Id. at 1144–47.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1144.
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information about them.204  Thus, this category is the unanticipated or
coerced use of personal information in a way that disadvantages the
individual.205  An example of unanticipated use is where a consumer
provides an email to sign up for a service only to find that email has
been sold to spammers.  A well-known, coerced use appears in
Schmerber v. California,206 in which officers drew a drunk-driving sus-
pect’s blood without his consent and introduced it at trial.207  Note that
“personal” in this theory relates specifically to the individual harmed,
not that the harm can be used to identify the person.  The subjective
and objective categories are related in much the same way as the tort
of assault relates to that of battery: the first involves the anticipation
of the second, but each represents a separate and distinct harm with
independent elements.208
Building on this theory, digital market manipulation creates sub-
jective privacy harms insofar as the consumer has a vague sense that
information is being collected and used to her disadvantage, but never
truly knows how or when.  In the digital market manipulation context,
the consumer does not know whether the price she is being charged is
the same as the one charged to someone else, or whether she would
have saved money by using a different browser or purchasing the item
on a different day.  The consumer does not know whether updating
his social network profile to reflect the death of a parent will later
result in advertisements with a heart-wrenching father and son theme.
She does not know whether the subtle difference in website layout
represents a “morph” to her cognitive style aimed at upping her in-
stinct to purchase or is just a figment of her imagination.  With this
experience in mind, this Article agrees with Daniel Solove’s labeling
the contemporary experience of the data subject as Kafkaesque.209
Whatever it is called, however, the experience is not a comfortable
one.
In addition to these subjective harms, digital market manipula-
tion also creates objective privacy harm when a firm uses personal
information to extract as much rent as possible from the consumer.
Even if we do not believe the economic harm story at the level of the
market, the mechanism of harm at the level of the consumer is rather
204 Id. at 1147-51.
205 Id. at 1148.
206 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
207 Id. at 758-59.
208 Calo, supra note 197, at 1143.
209 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Informa-
tion Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1419 (2001).
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clear: the consumer is shedding information that, without her knowl-
edge or against her wishes, will be used to charge her as much as pos-
sible, to sell her a product or service she does not need or needs less
of, or to convince her in a way that she would find objectionable were
she aware of the practice.210  Given the state of contemporary privacy
notice, it seems unlikely most consumers will catch on to digital mar-
ket manipulation in the short run, let alone consent to it.211  The firm
would not even have to change its written policies: they are general
enough even today to accommodate most of the practices identified
previously in this Article.212  Further, as described above, even were
the consumer eventually to be become aware of digital market manip-
ulation, she would be harmed to the extent she is forced to expend
resources to guard against these techniques.213
Knowing specifically who the subject of digital market manipula-
tion happens to be—her name, for instance—may facilitate informa-
tion sharing between firms or across both online and offline contexts.
Although this may be helpful in this limited sense, being able to per-
sonally identify the consumer is largely unnecessary.  All that is neces-
sary to trigger either category of privacy harm is the belief or actuality
that the person is being disadvantaged—that her experience is chang-
ing in subtle and material ways to her disadvantage.214  A firm does
not need to know specifically who the consumer is to extract rent by
exploiting her biases or creating a persuasion profile, only that the
observed behavior is that of the same person buying the good or visit-
ing the website.215  Hence, the ongoing anonymization wars may end
up having less relevance when it comes to digital market
manipulation.216
At least two concessions are important at this juncture.  The first
is that, where the consumer does not have any idea that her informa-
210 See supra Part II.
211 See Calo, supra note 20, at 1050-55.
212 See, e.g., supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
213 See supra Part III.B.1.  Peter Swire makes an analogous point in which he includes the
costs associated with self-protection, entitled “cloaking costs,” in his description of privacy
harms. See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveil-
lance, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 461, 475 (1999).
214 See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
215 See supra Part II.A.
216 Compare Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703-04 (2010) (arguing that de-anonymizing is too
routine for privacy statutes to exempt anonymized data from their ambit), with Jane Yakowitz,
Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (2011) (asserting that the dangers
of de-anonymization are overstated, and the benefits of data mining understated).
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tion will be used to tailor prices, pitches, or other aspects of her expe-
rience, she does not suffer subjective privacy harm.217  In today’s
society, the chances are very good that consumers will eventually
sense, hear, or read that something is amiss,218 but if that is not the
case, this Article concedes that the individual has not been harmed in
this specific way.  Similarly, where the unanticipated use of informa-
tion rebounds to the consumer’s benefit—as when a consumer’s room
has a hypoallergenic pillow anytime he stays within a particular hotel
network, where his use of a particular brand of computer leads to a
lower price, or where a doctor changes his prescription to reflect an
insight from big data—then he cannot be said to suffer objective pri-
vacy harm.219  Many of the ways firms tailor content or experiences
may be aimed at delighting consumers.220  It would be highly surpris-
ing, however, were every use to which a company placed intimate
knowledge of its consumer in fact a win-win.
3. Vulnerability as Autonomy Harm
None of the previous arguments attempt to assert that digital
market manipulation, at least in the hands of firms, is tantamount to
massive surveillance by the government.  Firms do not have a monop-
oly on coercion and their motive—profit—is discernible, stable, and
relatively acceptable when compared with the dangers that attend tyr-
anny.221  But to the extent that digital market manipulation influences
individuals subliminally, or else depletes limited resources of will-
power, our instincts may still lead people to speak in terms of harms
to individual or collective autonomy.222  For example, one might say
that aspects of digital market manipulation encroach upon “play,” in
other words “the modality through which situated subjects advance
their own contingent goals, constitute their communities, and imagine
their possible futures.”223  In another case, one might echo Neil Rich-
ards’s recent stance that corporate no less than government surveil-
217 See Calo, supra note 197, at 1159–61 (discussing the problem of the “hidden Peeping
Tom”).
218 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
219 Calo, supra note 197, at 1150–51.
220 See, e.g., Zarzky, supra note 11, at 209.
221 See Richards, supra note 11, at 1935 (discussing the public-private divide in digital sur-
veillance); cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (“Legal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.” (footnote omitted)).
222 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 57 (2012) (describing how increased surveillance can lead to
coordinated behavior that bends to the digital gaze instead of eliciting resistance).
223 Id.
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lance “affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the
watched.”224  Or, alternatively, one might assert that tailored content
provides third parties with “powerful tools of persuasion” that impli-
cate autonomy in some sense.225
Although one may make any of these assertions, the notion of
digital market manipulation, and particularly its grounding in behav-
ioral economics, leads to a more concrete conclusion.  The trouble
with autonomy arguments, which pervade the privacy literature, is
that drawing lines around the concept of autonomy is very difficult in
at least two ways.226  First, there is no stable, much less uncontro-
verted, definition of autonomy in moral or political theory.227  Some
scholars reject the notion of autonomy altogether.228  Second, not
every incursion on human will is problematic.  Not every impulse
purchase, upsell, or emotional pitch threatens consumer autonomy in
any deep sense.229  Not even a widespread campaign of persuasion
necessarily does so.  This line-drawing problem has led some to con-
clude that whereas it may be appropriate to regulate affirmatively
misleading marketing as deceptive practice, there is often no effective
way to regulate unfair persuasion.230
Behavioral economics, however, is not concerned with autonomy
as a political concept so much as the more material construct of irra-
tionality—the measurable departures from the self-interested course
224 Richards, supra note 11, at 1953.
225 Zarzky, supra note 11, at 219–20.
226 See id. at 219 n.19 (“Autonomy, somewhat like privacy, eludes a clear definition.”).
227 See John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ (last updated Feb. 25, 2011) (“The
variety of contexts in which the concept of autonomy functions has suggested to many that there
are simply a number of different conceptions of autonomy, and that the word simply refers to
different elements in each such of contexts.”).
228 See, e.g., J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3–5 (8th prtg. 2008) (arguing that Immanuel Kant “invented” rather than
“discovered” the concept of autonomy in political philosophy from disparate, constituent parts).
Others question autonomy as a subordinating value. See, e.g., Marina Oshana, How Much
Should We Value Autonomy?, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2003, at 99, 99, available at http://jour-
nals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&pdftype=1&fid=191526&jid=SOY&
volumeId=20&issueId=02&aid=191525 (“[T]he focus of this essay is on the phenomenon . . . of
being ‘blinded’ by the ideal of autonomy.  What happens if we value autonomy too much?”).
229 See, e.g., Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, supra note 13, at 665–80.
230 See, e.g., id. at 663, 678.  Craswell proposes the following standard for deceptive adver-
tising: “An advertisement is legally deceptive if and only if it leaves some consumers holding a
false belief about a product, and the ad could be cost-effectively changed to reduce the resulting
injury.” Id. at 678; see also Hoffman, supra note 13, at 1404 (“Almost every scholarly discussion
of false-advertising puffery cases bemoans the doctrine’s incoherent aspects.”).
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that autonomous subjects generally follow.231  It is not clear why firms
would ever want to confront the fully autonomous consumer capable
of maximizing her own self-interest, potentially at the cost of the
firm’s bottom line.232  Thus, the concern is that hyper-rational actors
armed with the ability to design most elements of the transaction will
approach the consumer of the future at the precise time and in the
exact way that tends to guarantee a moment of (profitable)
irrationality.233
In this way, systematic influence of the sort described in this Arti-
cle tends to collapse the ethical and legal distinction between the ordi-
nary and vulnerable consumer.  What does vulnerable mean in the
consumer context, after all, except that the relevant population will
not act in its best interest?  In its purest form, digital market manipu-
lation recognizes that vulnerability is contextual and a matter of de-
gree and specifically aims to render all consumers as vulnerable as
possible at the time of purchase.234  A given consumer may not be
vulnerable most of the time and will act rationally in her own inter-
est.235  But under very specific conditions—say, when confronted with
scarcity by a trusted source after a long day at work or upon making
her hundredth decision of a day—she may prove vulnerable for a
short window.236  Therefore, a firm with the capacity and incentive to
exploit a consumer could, for instance, monitor the number of deci-
sions she makes on her phone and target the customer most intensely
at the moment she is most depleted.237
231 See Etzioni, supra note 61, at 1100 (describing behavioral economics and its challenge to
the dominant assumptions of traditional economics, i.e., “assumptions that focus on rational ac-
tors, seeking to optimize their utility”).
232 See supra Part I (describing firm incentives in the market manipulation context).
233 See supra Part II (analyzing how firms can use the digital world to precisely exploit
vulnerabilities).
234 See supra Part II.A.  Part IV deals with solutions to these problems, but one must note
that a more contextual understanding of vulnerability could help curb abuse in this context.  For
example, Florencia Luna defends “layers” of vulnerability over labels: “[A] way of understand-
ing this proposal is not by thinking that someone is vulnerable, but by considering a particular
situation that makes or renders someone vulnerable.” See Florencia Luna, Elucidating the Con-
cept of Vulnerability: Layers Not Labels, INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS, Spring
2009, at 121, 129.
235 See, e.g., BAUMEISTER & TIERNEY, supra note 3, at 1–5 (describing vulnerability
studies).
236 Recent work speaks of willpower as a finite resource, one that can be exhausted by a
hard day of decisionmaking.  For a recent and accessible review of the literature, see generally
id.
237 See supra Part II.C.
1034 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:995
To be clear, this Article’s argument is predicated on two commit-
ments.  First, that autonomy is defined in the consumer context as the
absence of vulnerability or the capacity to act upon the market in the
consumer’s self-interest.  Second, that consumer vulnerability gener-
ally is something the law should care about?an assumption for which
there is much support.238  The advancement in this Article is to ob-
serve that intervention may be justified not only where a consumer is
already vulnerable, and firms are taking advantage, but also?and in-
deed a fortiori?where the firm is leveraging what it knows about the
consumer in order to purposefully render that specific consumer
vulnerable.
C. Free Speech Trump Card?
Thus far, this Article has countered the arguments that digital
market manipulation is not new and, therefore, not harmful.  In addi-
tion to this critique, skeptics might make a third observation: firms
have a free speech right to select and execute their message.  There-
fore, according to such an argument, although the nature of persua-
sion may be changing and some might see one or more harms in the
new approach, the law cannot possibly curtail this activity in a manner
consistent with the First Amendment.  Any such interference by the
government would necessarily require telling firms they may not make
certain true statements such as “while supplies last” or interfering
with design decisions on the basis of their psychological impact.  In
this way, such regulations would be akin to telling a painter that she
may not use perspective because it tricks the mind into seeing depth
where it does not exist.
As an initial matter, the subject here is commercial marketing,
not political speech.  The application of big data to politics and elec-
tioneering, as recent reporting trends evidence, is a major engine be-
hind the changing face of persuasion.239  Laws affecting political
238 There are special protections in place, for instance, for the elderly, children, pregnant
women, and for other “vulnerable” populations. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012) (regulating “unfair and deceptive acts and practices
in connection with collection and use of personal information from and about children on the
Internet”); 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012) (entitling employees to leave in the case of birth of a child,
adoption of a child, or a serious health condition of the employee or one of the employee’s
immediate family members); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(17) (West 2007) (enhancing
criminal penalties if victim is pregnant).
239 See generally, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Data You Can Believe In: How The Precision Target-
ing of “Persuadable” Voters That Put Obama Over the Top in 2012 Could Revolutionize the
Advertising Industry, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 23, 2013, at 22 (chronicling the rise of data-driven
campaigning and the migration of campaign staffers to advertising firms following the election).
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speech, however, will be subject to strict scrutiny, whereas this argu-
ment assumes that a court will consider all facets of digital market
manipulation commercial speech240—recognizing that a skeptic may
find this a big assumption in its own right.241  That said, some of the
arguments that follow, particularly the discussion regarding the differ-
ence between the act of information collection and the content of
speech, would of course relate to data-driven electioneering as well.
Is it possible, then, to curtail digital market manipulation without
offending the First Amendment?  One strategy would be to cut the
practice off at the source.  After all, each of the techniques and harms
previously described in this Article relies on personal (if not person-
ally identifiable) information about consumers.242  By limiting or con-
ditioning the collection of such information by firms, regulators could
limit market manipulation at the activity level.243  As Neil Richards
observes, “[a] wide variety of rules operate, directly or indirectly, to
restrict access to information without raising First Amendment is-
sues.”244  A simple example is trespass: even the press, mentioned by
name in the Constitution, cannot break into your house to investigate
an important story.245  Another is antiwiretapping laws, one of which
the Supreme Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge in
Bartnicki v. Vopper.246  Taking into account these examples, one can
imagine the government fashioning a rule?perhaps inadvisable for
other reasons?that limits the collection of information about consum-
ers in order to reduce asymmetries of information.
Although enacting such a limiting statute bears consideration, it
turns out not everyone agrees that limiting information collection can
avoid First Amendment scrutiny where the purpose behind the collec-
tion is speech.  In 2008, for instance, the Newspaper Association of
America filed comments with the Federal Trade Commission in which
240 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561–64 (1980) (distinguishing commercial from political speech and laying out the standard of
review).
241 The Supreme Court had the chance to expand or narrow the definition of commercial
speech in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, a case involving a corporation coming to its own defense against
allegations of labor abuse.  Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656–58 (2003).  The Court declined
to implement such an expansion over several dissents. Id. at 665–84.
242 See supra Part II.
243 Cf. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1980)
(providing a classic discussion of the role of “activity level” in tort).
244 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1182 (2005).
245 Id. at 1188.
246 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001).
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it asserted a First Amendment right on behalf of news outlets to track
consumers for the purpose of targeting ads to them.247  A variety of
prominent academics also make this argument in one form or another,
among them liberal First Amendment scholar Robert O’Neil.248
The most recent and sustained case for the proposition that data
is itself speech is that of Jane Yakowitz Bambauer.249  Bambauer’s
method involves critiquing doctrine that distinguishes gathering infor-
mation from speech, while highlighting strains in First Amendment
law that tend in her view to bolster the case that collecting data for the
purpose of speech is itself protectable speech.250  Bambauer criticizes
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,251 for instance, wherein the Ninth Circuit
ruled against a reporter who used deceit to gain access to an office and
secretly record a therapy session to expose the plaintiff as a medical
fraud, on the basis that the court arbitrarily favored an older technol-
ogy (written notes) over a new one (video and audio recording).252
Instead, she offers U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC253 from the Tenth Circuit
and the recent Supreme Court case of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.254 as
examples of cases in which a court properly recognized that data can
be speech.255 U.S. West involved a successful challenge by carriers to a
rule that limited how they could use customer information they hold
by virtue of providing a communications service to market to those
customers,256 whereas IMS Health involved how pharmaceutical com-
panies could use prescription data to market to doctors.257
247 Comments of the Newspaper Association of America to the FTC In the Matter of Pro-
posed Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy Principles (Apr. 11, 2008) (on file with the George
Washington Law Review).
248 See ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 74–90 (2001);
see also Richards, supra note 244, at 1161–62 (listing examples).
249 See generally Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014).
250 See id. at 58–64.  Bambauer also engages with First Amendment theory more generally,
and her stated aim is to create “a satisfying analytical framework for the variety of data collec-
tion practices that will give rise to First Amendment questions.” Id. at 63.  She goes on, how-
ever, to adopt Seana Shiffrin’s “thinker-based” approach for triggering free speech scrutiny
nearly verbatim and declines to comment on the level of scrutiny that should apply to data as
speech. See id. at 83, 88, 104–106 (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to
Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011)).
251 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
252 Id. at 248–50; Bambauer, supra note 249, at 77–78, 85–86.
253 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
254 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
255 Bambauer, supra note 249, at 71–74.
256 U.S. West, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1229–30.
257 IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
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Bambauer’s argument is lucid, novel, and engaging; yet, it has the
feel of a zoetrope, spinning static case law in a certain light to create
the illusion of forward motion. Dietemann is not a well-written opin-
ion, but that does not make it wrongly decided.  The best reading of
Dietemann is as a case concerning the scope of consent?a well-under-
stood concept of tort law.258  A landowner may consent to entry for
one purpose, such as therapy or discussion, but not to another, such as
video or audio recording.259  The Supreme Court says this almost ex-
actly in the Fourth Amendment context in Florida v. Jardines,260 the
recent dog-sniffing case.  The Court held that the officers intruded
upon the defendant’s property by virtue of bringing along a surveil-
lance technology (the dog), even though the officers have a right to
approach the house to knock on his door.261 U.S. West and IMS
Health, meanwhile, involved information already in the possession of
the speaker262 or subject to discriminatory conditions that trigger scru-
tiny even for unprotected speech.263  These cases and other examples
clarify free speech doctrine in small ways, but do not justify the con-
clusion that limits on the collection of data necessarily implicate the
First Amendment.  The most powerful line of cases Bambauer mar-
shals264 involves the right to photograph a government official.265
These precedents deal with true collection of information.266  The is-
258 See Jack K. Levin & Lucas Martin, Scope of Consent, 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 75
(2007) (“One may become a trespasser by exceeding the scope of the consent, such as by inten-
tionally conducting oneself in a manner differing from that allowed.” (footnote omitted)).
259 See id. Alternatively, one might say that society is prepared to accept Dietemann’s
expectation of privacy against recording technology as reasonable and compensate him accord-
ingly.  Bambauer seems to acknowledge as much in other work. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer,
The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 235 (2012) (“The tort of intrusion reinforces
norms by tracking social consensus, which means that most people will recognize what is and is
not seclusion, even in new contexts.  This makes the tort especially flexible and appropriate for
application to new technologies.”).
260 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
261 Id. at 1415–16 (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”).
262 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999).
263 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011) (“Given the legislature’s
expressed statement of purpose, it is apparent that [the law] imposes burdens that are based on
the content of speech and that are aimed at a particular viewpoint. . . . It follows that heightened
judicial scrutiny is warranted.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–85 (1992)
(prohibiting viewpoint discrimination even for otherwise proscribable categories of speech such
as “fighting words”).
264 Bambauer, supra note 249, at 82–83, 84 n.117.
265 See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (videotaping the police in
public); Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 510–13 (D.N.J. 2006)
(photographing the mayor in public).
266 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 79; Pomykacz, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 510–13.
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sue in such cases, however, is not private commercial speech but
photographing government activity in public, implicating deeper val-
ues than those at play in digital market manipulation.267
Assume, however, that one answers the “coverage” question in
the affirmative and says that all aspects of digital market manipulation
are subject to the same commercial speech analysis that applies to
other advertisements.268  Short of viewpoint discrimination, the Court
has repeatedly clarified that no protection attaches to misleading
speech in this context.269  The Court is not talking here of fraud—in
the sense of a material misrepresentation of fact—but only a tendency
to mislead.270  Digital market manipulation presents an easy case:
firms purposefully leverage information about consumers to their dis-
advantage in a way that is designed not to be detectable to them.  A
consumer who uploads a picture of herself to a social network is un-
likely to associate the disclosure with a later advertisement that uses
the picture to persuade her.271  A consumer who receives an ad high-
lighting the limited supply of a product will not usually understand
that the next person, who has not been associated with a fear of scar-
city, sees a different pitch based on her biases.272  Such a practice does
not just tend to mislead; misleading is the entire point.
What if marketing informed by personalized appeals to irrational-
ity is not misleading as such?  Lesser protection even than commercial
speech may still be appropriate by analogy to Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association.273  In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down an Ari-
zona law prohibiting advertising by lawyers on commercial speech
grounds in a famous case called Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.274  The
Bates Court expressly reserved the question of whether in-person so-
267 Cf. Richards, supra note 244, at 1220 (“The critics’ attempt to clothe economic rights
with the garb of political rights would destroy the basic dualism on which the edifice of modern
rights jurisprudence is built.”).
268 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 1 (2012) (distinguishing “coverage,”
whether the First Amendment applies at all, from “protection,” the level of scrutiny free speech
then requires).
269 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
270 See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,
38–40 (2000).
271 See Conference Program, Consumer Psychology in a Social Media World, supra note 12,
at 11.
272 See supra Part II.C.
273 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
274 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383–84 (1977).
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licitation would be subject to the same scrutiny.275  A year later, in
Ohralik, the Court decided that it would not: “In-person solicitation is
as likely as not to discourage persons needing counsel from engaging
in a critical comparison of the ‘availability, nature, and prices’ of legal
services . . . .”276  As such, in-person solicitation “may disserve the
individual and societal interest, identified in Bates, in facilitating ‘in-
formed and reliable decisionmaking.’”277  The Court thought “it
hardly need be said that the potential for overreaching is significantly
greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person.”278
Lawyers are probably more persuasive than the average popula-
tion; it is one skill taught in law school.  One should question, how-
ever, if lawyers are more persuasive than firms engaged in digital
market manipulation.  Firms have increasingly intimate knowledge of
their customers, which they turn over to a team of people with letters
after their name (including J and D).279  Moreover, the Ohralik Court
also noted that people in need of legal services may be vulnerable.280
But the very purpose of digital market manipulation is to render con-
sumers vulnerable by fostering irrational behavior.281  In any event,
the Ohralik Court did not draw the line at attorneys or vulnerable
populations, referring repeatedly to their “agents” as well as simply
“abuses inherent in the direct-selling industry.”282
Perhaps the distinction lies not in the seller’s credentials, but in
the fact that the lawyer or salesman is there in-person.283  A hospital
room is neutral territory, one that the lawyer cannot overly influence.
The firm’s encounter with the mediated consumer takes place in an
environment the firm designed from scratch for that very encounter.284
275 Id. at 366 (declining to “resolve the problems associated with in-person solicitation of
clients—at the hospital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue
influence”).
276 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 364).  This Article reads Robert
Post to suggest that a better way to conceive of misleading speech is with reference “not to the
content of speech, but to the structural relationship between a speaker and her audience.”  Post,
supra note 270, at 38.  Either way, the protection afforded commercial speech will not apply.
277 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 364).
278 Id. at 464–65.
279 See supra notes 115, 146 and accompanying text.
280 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465.
281 See supra Part II.B.
282 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464 nn.22–23.
283 See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988) (“In assessing the potential for
overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference.”).
284 See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
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Also of interest to the Ohralik Court was “one of the fundamentals in
[the consumer’s] role as an informed purchaser, the decision as to
when, where, and how he will present himself to the marketplace.”285
But this role too is on its way out.286  Firms can and do interrupt the
consumer who is not shopping—for instance, by texting her on her
phone as she passes by the storefront of a client.287  This reality will
only accelerate in a world of “wearable” computers, or in which our
appliances and other objects have interfaces and Internet
connections.288
The final difference is that, notwithstanding Citizens United v.
FEC,289 firms are not people.  One of the weapons in the arsenal of
the in-person solicitor is ordinary social mores against rudeness and
the way we are hardwired or socialized to react to one another.290  Me-
diating technologies such as computers, the argument asserts, cannot
engage in this sort of social persuasion and hence present less of a
danger.
In actuality, the opposite is true.  For instance, research by design
psychologist B.J. Fogg shows that people react to social persuasion by
computers the same as real people.291  Individuals respond to virtual
flattery, for instance, and feel the need to return the kindness of
software.292  Technology has, if anything, additional advantages over
people in that it never tires, has a nearly limitless memory, and can
obscure or change its identity at will.293  In short, the potential for reg-
ulators to focus on the collection of data for an unexpected purpose,
the potential of digital market manipulation to mislead, or the possi-
bility of undue influence mean that our skeptic probably overstates
the free speech rights of firms in this context.
285 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464 n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286 See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, Ad Texts, Tailored to Location, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at B6.
287 See id.
288 See Bill Wasik, Try It On, WIRED, Jan. 2014, at 90; Mark Prigg, Samsung Confirms It Is
‘Investing Heavily’ in Wearable Computers to Take on Google Glass and Apple’s Rumoured
iWatch, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (July 9, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/
article-2358924/Samsung-confirms-investing-heavily-wearable-computers-takes-Google-Glass-
Apples-rumoured-iWatch.html.
289 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
found inter alia that corporations constitute associations of individuals for purposes of the First
Amendment. Id. at 342–65.
290 See supra note 42.
291 B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE
THINK AND DO 103–05 (2003).
292 Id.
293 Id. at 6–7.
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IV. BREAKING THE CYCLE
If history is any guide, society should expect advancements in the
art and science of persuasion to continue to trigger periodic concern.
Whether the change involves subliminal advertising, “neuromarket-
ing,”294 or digital market manipulation, it seems selling cannot evolve
without sitting poorly in some quarters.  Sometimes there is real harm
associated with new ways to sell.  This Article is not, ultimately, about
whether new or stronger rules are appropriate and, if they are, how
exactly to fashion them.  This Article leaves that to others or to future
work.  Rather, this project is about evidencing how a problem regula-
tors have managed to ignore is likely to accelerate to the point where
intervention is inevitable.  This Part nevertheless briefly canvases the
options these regulators will have and offers a few creative solutions
based on the original suggestions of Hanson and Kysar around how to
address market manipulation.
One choice is, of course, to do nothing. Caveat emptor, as the
saying goes.  But this colorful bit of Latin—of recent vintage, inciden-
tally, and deeply at odds with Roman consumer protection law it-
self295—is not sustainable.  Doing nothing will continue to expand the
trust gap between consumers and firms296 and, depending on one’s
perspective, could do irreparable harm to consumers and the market-
place.  Another possibility is to prohibit certain practices outright.
The problem with this approach—and command-and-control gener-
ally in the context of emerging technology—is the high risk of unin-
tended consequences.297  Poorly drafted restrictions could slow
294 For a definition of neuromarketing, as well as a clever discussion of its intersection with
commercial speech doctrine, see generally Marisa E. Main, Simply Irresistible: Neuromarketing
and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2012).
295 Roman law imposed wide-ranging duties of good faith (bonae fidei). See BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 176 (1962).  Signs of duress (metus) and or bad
faith, broadly defined (dolus), could negate a transaction. Id. Even the failure of one party to
correct a misapprehension of the other party constituted bad faith. Id.  I have Hugh Spitzer to
thank for this point.
296 The 2013 Edelman Trust Barometer shows that of more than 31,000 respondents, only
nineteen percent trust business leaders to make ethical and moral decisions. Edelman
Trustbarometer: 2013 Annual Global Study, EDELMAN (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.edelman.com/
trust-downloads/global-results-2/ (showing results on slide 30 of the presentation).  Twenty-three
percent of respondents cited “wrong incentives for driving business decisions” as a reason for
trusting business less (second only to “corruption or fraud” at twenty-seven percent). Id. at slide
12.
297 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 303 (2011) (“The shortcomings of command-and-control govern-
ance . . . are well recognized.”); Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Pri-
vacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 9, 10–11, 33–37 (2006)
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innovation by imposing unmanageable risk and could serve to select
technologic winners and losers.298  As discussed previously, outright
bans or aggressive restrictions could face serious First Amendment
headwinds.299  This is not to say that top-down regulation is impossi-
ble, only difficult.
One of the more obvious paths to domesticate digital market ma-
nipulation is to strengthen privacy protections.  As described above,
the trends that constitute digital market manipulation rely for their
vitality on individual information about consumers.300  The mass pro-
duction of bias, disclosure ratcheting, persuasion profiling, and
morphing all require access to large consumer data sets or specific
consumer details.301  The information has to come from somewhere
(or someone).  Requiring better anonymization or security is not a
true solution, since the harms of digital market manipulation do not
rely on the person being identified or her information stolen.302  “Ob-
scurity” mostly protects peer interactions?the mediated consumer is
never really hidden from the firm.303  But placing limits like those sug-
gested by the fair information practice principles—best practices that
provide for data minimization, for instance, and limits on secondary
use—could help stem the flow of information that makes abuses
possible.304
Using stronger privacy laws to cut data off at its source presents
its own set of difficulties.  Obviously manipulating consumers is not
the only, nor the primary, use to which firms will put consumer data.
Data helps firms improve existing products and develop the indispen-
sable services of tomorrow.305  Data is necessary to combat various
kinds of fraud and sometimes to police against one set of consumers
(arguing that “command-and-control type regulations would not be a good fit for the highly
diverse and dynamic digital economy” due to the expense and threat to innovation); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627 (critiquing command-and-control
regulation).
298 See Hirsch, supra note 297, at 33–37.
299 See supra Part III.C.
300 See supra Part II.A.
301 See supra notes 73–81 and accompanying text.
302 See id.
303 See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity,
101 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (formalizing the concept of obscurity as a means to minimize the risk
that information will find its way to unintended recipients).
304 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE  27–28 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/doc-
uments/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-
commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf.
305 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.google.com/policies/pri-
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abusing another.306  Regulators are rightfully concerned about the ef-
fects of cutting off data flows on innovation.307  Telling services what
data they can and cannot collect, meanwhile, creates pragmatic line-
drawing problems that regulators may not be well-suited to answer.308
These issues are not limited to privacy.  The FTC, through en-
forcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act,309 polices against all
manner of offensive business practices.310  Significant, perhaps infeasi-
ble changes to the agency’s authority would be needed to tackle digi-
tal market manipulation.  Hanson and Kysar in passing,311 and
Matthew Edwards at length,312 argue that unfairness and deception
are not today well-suited to domesticating the problem of market ma-
nipulation.  Even invigorated for the digital age, the practice may not
be deceptive in the classic sense (despite being misleading for com-
mercial speech purposes) because it neither makes a false statement
nor omits any single material fact.313  The practice is not unfair be-
cause, with effort, it might be avoided, and because the harm is not of
the variety usually countenanced by agencies or courts.314  The FTC
has limited resources and reliably pursues complaints only against
very bad or very big players.315  Firms can also approach the mediated
vacy/ (stating data collection is necessary because it enables Google to develop new and improve
existing products).
306 For instance, the online auction website eBay uses data to police against shill bidding,
i.e., where an auctioneer bids on his own items in order to drive up other bids. Shill Bidding
Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/seller-shill-bidding.html (last visited Aug. 22,
2014).
307 See Hirsch, supra note 297, at 33–37.
308 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 1440 (describing similar problems with deceptive
advertising).
309 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
310 See id.
311 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1556 (expressing skepticism that the FTC would
be able to police against market manipulation with its existing tools).
312 See generally Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
323, 324–25 (2008) (illustrating the various challenges the FTC would encounter were it to try to
bring claims based on behavioral economics).
313 Cliffdale Assocs., Inc. 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174 (1984) (FTC Policy Statement on De-
ception) (defining deception).
314 Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070, 1073 (1984) (FTC Policy Statement on
Unfairness) (defining unfairness).
315 Peter Swire has helpfully distinguished between “elephants,” i.e., companies too big to
avoid scrutiny, and “mice,” who can hope to ignore the law.  Peter P. Swire, Elephants and Mice
Revisited: Law and Choice of Law on the Internet, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1978–79 (2005).
Indeed, the FTC tends to seek consent orders with large companies with arguably mild privacy
or security infractions, and smaller companies engaged in more flagrant behavior. See Marcia
Hofmann, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy, in Proskauer on Privacy § 4:1
(Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2013) (regularly updated summary of FTC privacy enforcement).
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consumer anytime and anywhere, such that regulators would have to
protect or empower the consumer at all times and everywhere.316
Mandatory disclosure may have a role.  Some of the very same
techniques described in Part II of this Article might be pressed into
the service of better, more efficient notice.  Additionally, as Richard
Craswell most recently argued, the optimal level of disclosure is usu-
ally something greater than none.317  Yet, there are also reasons to
doubt the efficacy of notice in the context of digital market manipula-
tion.  The same incentives that lead firms to leverage cognitive bias to
disadvantage consumers could lead them to comply with the letter of
notice regulations while minimizing its efficacy.318  Moreover, to the
extent notice is about changing behavior,319 some studies suggest that
telling a subject about a manipulation does not necessarily reduce its
impact.320
Hanson and Kysar perform a similar exercise in seeking to do-
mesticate the original problem of market manipulation and settle on a
place where traditional and behavioral law and economics tend to
converge: the importance of incentives.321  Personalization, too, be-
comes problematic when the incentives of the consumer and the firm
are not aligned.322  Hanson and Kysar, writing in the specific context
of product warnings, argue for enterprise liability as a way to realign
the incentives of firms and consumers and head off abuse.323  Having
updated the theory on market manipulation for the digital age in Parts
II and III, this Part begins to update the way incentive-based mea-
sures might also help address digital market manipulation.  What fol-
lows, therefore, are two unusual examples of ways of leveraging
internal or external forces to help change incentives and help inter-
rupt the cycle of abuse and suspicion.
316 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 312, at 353–69.
317 See Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their
Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 347–48 (2013).
318 See Calo, supra note 20, at 1065–68.
319 Arguably notice is about conveying information, whereas nudging is about changing
behavior. See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 775–78 (2014).
320 For instance, patients might be reticent to ignore the advice of doctors who have dis-
closed a conflict of interest for fear of insinuating corruption. See George Loewenstein et al.,
The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 101 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 423, 424 (2011).
321 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1553–57.
322 See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text.
323 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1553–57; see also Hoffman, supra note 13, at
1443–45 (endorsing an incentive-based approach to puffery regulation).
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A. Internal: Consumer Subject Review Boards
“Scientists don’t just spontaneously ‘try things’; they are
forced to think through the social and political consequences
of their work, often well before entering the lab.  What institu-
tional research board would approve Google’s quixotic plan
to send a fleet of vehicles to record private data floating
through WiFi networks or the launch of Google Buzz . . . ?”324
In the nineteen-seventies, the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare commissioned eleven individuals, in-
cluding two law professors, to study the ethics of biomedical and be-
havioral science and issue detailed recommendations.325  The resulting
Belmont Report—named after an intensive workshop at the Smithso-
nian Institute’s Belmont Conference Center—is a statement of princi-
ples that aims to assist researchers in resolving ethical problems
around human-subject research.326  The Report emphasized informed
consent—a mainstay of privacy, healthcare, and other legal con-
texts.327  In recognition of the power dynamic between experimenter
and subject, however, the Report highlighted additional principles of
“beneficence” and “justice.”328  Beneficence refers to minimizing
harm to the subject and society while maximizing benefit—a kind of
ethical Learned Hand Formula.329  Justice prohibits unfairness in dis-
tribution, defined as the undue imposition of a burden or withholding
of a benefit.330  The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
published the Belmont Report verbatim in the Federal Register and
expressly adopted its principles as a statement of Department
policy.331
324 EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOG-
ICAL SOLUTIONISM 148 (2013). There are several flaws with technology critic Evgeny Morozov’s
analogy as presented.  There is little evidence, for instance, to suggest that Google recorded
personal WiFi data on purpose, and ample evidence that the company routinely thinks through
ethical dilemmas such as when and how to report government requests for censorship or user
data.  The problem with Google Buzz—a social network that lead to a privacy law suit—was not
enough consumer testing.  But analyze the observation from a different direction.  When firms
study consumers scientifically for gain, why should scientific norms not apply?
325 NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
326 Id. 1–2.
327 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 99, at 657–65 (listing several dozen examples
of health, privacy, and other laws that require informed consent).
328 See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 325, at 4.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).
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Today, any academic researcher who conducts experiments in-
volving people is obligated to comply with robust ethical principles
and guidelines for the protection of human subjects, even if the pur-
pose of the experiment is to benefit those people or society.332  The
researcher must justify her study in advance to an Institutional Re-
view Board (“IRB”) comprised of peers and structured according to
specific federal regulations.333  In contrast, a private company that
conducts experiments involving thousands of consumers using the
same basic techniques, facilities, and personnel faces no such obliga-
tions, even where the purpose is to profit at the expense of the re-
search subject.334
Subjecting companies to the strictures of the Belmont Report and
academic institutional review would not be appropriate.  Firms must
operate at speed and scale, protect trade secrets, and satisfy investors.
Their motivations, cultures, and responsibilities differ from one an-
other and that is setting aside the many criticisms of IRBs in their
original context as plodding or skewed.335  Still, a largely internal
method to realign incentives between firm-scientists and consumer-
subjects would be to follow the path of the behavioral and social sci-
ence community in the wake of twentieth-century abuses.
The thought experiment considering such a solution is simple
enough: the FTC, Department of Commerce, or industry itself com-
missions an interdisciplinary report on the ethics of consumer re-
search.  The report is thoroughly vetted by key stakeholders at an
intensive conference in neutral territory.  As with the Belmont Re-
port, the emphasis is on the big picture, not any particular practice,
effort, or technology.336  The articulation of principles is incorporated
in its entirety in the Federal Register or an equivalent.  In addition,
each company that conducts consumer research at scale creates a
small internal committee comprised of employees and operated ac-
332 See id. at 23,193.
333 See id. at 23,195–96.
334 Cf. MOROZOV, supra note 324, at 148; Main, supra note 294, at 625 (“Traditional meth-
ods of marketing research have not been subject to Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) over-
sight, because they are not usually viewed as experimentation . . . .”); Ohm, supra note 73, at 345
(suggesting that medical research should be conducted in accordance to the “Common Rule”
and other human subject guidelines).
335 See Charles W. Lidz & Suzanne Garverich, What the ANPRM Missed: Additional Needs
for IRB Reform, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 390 (2013) (“IRBs have always come under consid-
erable criticism.  Some have critiqued IRBs for using important resources inefficiently . . . .
Others have critiqued the inconsistency of review of multi-site projects.”).
336 See generally BELMONT REPORT, supra note 325.
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cording to predetermined rules.337  Initiatives clearly intended to ben-
efit consumers could be fast-tracked, whereas, say, an investigation of
how long moviegoers will sit through commercials before demanding
a refund will be flagged for further review.
B. External: The Paid-Option Regime
In 2010, Stanford Law School sent a delegation to Beijing, China,
to discuss Internet law, and I was there to cover consumer privacy.  I
gave a fairly typical talk about the tension between the firm’s need to
gather data in order to deliver quality goods and services for free and
the consequences to consumers of giving up so much privacy.  At-
tendees included major Chinese Internet companies such as Tencent
and Baidu.  It turns out that the tension I described did not resonate
with major Chinese platforms or their regulators for the simple reason
that these platforms make their money by charging subscription and
other fees.  Thus, they did not perceive a need to leverage the data
they held on consumers beyond what it took to deliver the service.338
Considering the example of the Chinese Internet companies, im-
agine if major platforms such as Facebook and Google were obligated,
as a matter of law or best practice, to offer a paid version of their
service.  For, say, ten dollars a month or five cents a visit, users could
opt out of the entire marketing ecosystem.  Not all services would be
amenable to such an arrangement.  There would be losers?for in-
stance, some set of third-party advertisers or data brokers that deliver
little value directly to consumers in the first place.  Where applicable,
however, such an arrangement could reorient the consumer from be-
ing a product to being a client.339  This in turn would interrupt the
incentive for market manipulation, digital or otherwise?assuming the
337 Without delving into issues of standards or structure, Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger and
Kenneth Cukier briefly suggest that firms employ “internal algorithmists” akin to ombudsman
that vet big data projects for integrity and societal impact. See MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER &
CUKIER, supra note 70, at 180–82.
338 Of course, these companies have other problems. See Anupam Chander, How Censor-
ship Hurts Chinese Internet Companies, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/13/08/how-censorship-hurts-chinese-internet-companies/
278587/.
339 Cf. Webster, supra note 44, at 598 (citing PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS:
MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND THE AUDIENCE MARKETPLACE 2–3 (2003)) (distinguishing between
markets in which media is sold to audiences and markets where audiences are sold to advertis-
ers).  A recent study by Juniper Networks found that free apps were between 300 and 400 per-
cent more likely to track users than paid ones. See Daniel Hoffman, Exposing Your Personal
Information—There’s an App for That, JUNIPER NETWORKS (Oct. 30, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://
forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Mobility-Now/Exposing-Your-Personal-Information-There-s-An-
App-for-That/ba-p/166058.
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arrangement were adequately policed by the government or the
market.
Some research suggests that few consumers would take a firm up
on this opportunity.340  For the consumers that stick with the “free”
option, some level of protection may nevertheless be necessary.
Moreover, this approach could exacerbate the so-called “digital di-
vide,” the concern that not everyone has access to the Internet or
other resources due to economic and educational constraints.341  Ser-
vices such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn have become arguably
indispensable economic, social, and civic tools for many citizens.  Soci-
ety would have to address, perhaps through a subsidy or another ex-
pedient, the needs of the set of people who value privacy highly but
cannot afford to pay for each service they believe necessary.342  These
concerns already exist today with the advent of paid services that help
protect the affluent from reputational harm, but could be augmented
in a paid-option regime.343
Again, this Article does not offer these examples of internal or
external realignment on the view that they are somehow the “right”
solution, let alone a panacea.  The point is that society might take a
page (the page) from law and economics, as Hanson and Kysar do,344
and give serious consideration to a solution set aimed at changing the
underlying incentives.
V. TAKING DATA SERIOUSLY
The field of behavioral economics is now decades old;345 yet it
continues to yield novel insights.  For example, a handful of scholars
have begun to focus on the possibility that consumers and citizens do
not have the exact same biases or hold those biases to the same de-
gree.346  In a contemporary article, Lior Strahilevitz and Ariel Porat
discuss how the government might vary default rules by person to
340 See, e.g., Mary Ellen Gordon, The History of App Pricing, and Why Most Apps Are
Free, FLURRY (July 18, 2013), http://www.flurry.com/bid/99013/The-History-of-App-Pricing-
And-Why-Most-Apps-Are-Free (noting that when consumers are given a choice between an ad-
vertisement free app or an app with even a nominal onetime fee, consumers overwhelmingly
choose the advertisement infused free version).
341 See, e.g., JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE DEEPENING DIVIDE: INEQUALITY IN THE INFOR-
MATION SOCIETY 1 (2005).
342 Cf. id. 1–8.
343 Cf. id.
344 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 1553–57.
345 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Belief, supra note 60, at 105.
346 See, e.g., Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1418–22.
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make nudges more effective.347  Despite this small advancement, the
few forays into the personalization of behavioral economics have
barely uncovered the tip of the iceberg.  This Article has explored
how and why data and design could change the face of market manip-
ulation to the point that it strains consumer protection law.348  The
impact of systematic personalization on behavioral economics is broad
indeed and calls for future research.
This Article has focused exclusively on the fate of the consumer
of tomorrow.  There is also the citizen of the future to consider.  How
will the same emerging techniques affect the government’s ability to
influence citizen belief or conduct?  This is an especially salient con-
sideration given the traction libertarian paternalism has enjoyed in the
United States and abroad and the pivot of a central proponent toward
greater personalization.349  Sunstein and Thaler respond to the general
concern that exploiting citizen bias is manipulative by invoking the
“publicity principle” of John Rawls—the notion that officials should
not engage in an activity that they would not be comfortable discuss-
ing in public.350  Setting aside any issues with this argument, it seems
unlikely to hold up in the face of “digital nudging.”  Gathering infor-
mation about individual citizens to better persuade them comes very
close to the sort of Orwellian propaganda society has collectively re-
jected.351  A related critique of nudging is that it tends to infantilize
the citizen by removing the habit of choice.352  Again, the constant
mediation of the citizen by technology could accelerate this effect.
The discussion in Part II.C carves out individualized political
speech.  The extent of this exception, however, remains unclear: how
should law or society treat political ads by candidates or causes that
leverage individual biases to make their campaigns more effective?
Such techniques portend an arguably greater threat to autonomy.353
At the same time, their restriction will sensibly occasion more serious
pushback from the First Amendment.354  Striking the right balance,
meanwhile, is important: political campaigns appear to be at the fore-
347 See id.
348 See supra Part II.
349 See supra note 22.
350 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 244–45 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971)).
351 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1464b (2012) (limiting domestic propaganda).
352 See Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in PREFERENCE CHANGE: APPROACHES FROM
PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 207, 207–20 (Till Gru¨ne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hans-
son eds., 2009).
353 See supra Part III.C.
354 See id.
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front of persuasion profiling and other phenomena described in this
Article (although its architects are moving into commercial
advertising).355
This Article has noted that the effect of standard market manipu-
lation has been marginal.356  The same is said of behavioral economics
generally: proponents argue that behavioral economics helps explain
seemingly outlier behavior by judges that otherwise attempt to maxi-
mize social or economic welfare.357  But detractors—especially those
working with more traditional economic models—try to paint con-
sumer irrationality as modest or even self-cancelling.358  The potential
to manufacture bias and the greater incentive by firms to encourage
irrationality would change this picture (if ever it were true), bolstering
the case for law and economics to take behavior seriously.
CONCLUSION
Vance Packard, author of The Hidden Persuaders, assumed mar-
keting science would evolve well beyond what he had documented in
1957.359  Near the end of his book, he remarks: “Eventually—say by
A.D. 2000—perhaps all this depth manipulation of the psychological
variety will seem amusingly old-fashioned.”360  Packard also acknowl-
edges that the marketers of the late 1950s were “mostly decent, lika-
ble people” who “want to control us just a little bit”; they might be
appalled, he suggests, by the technologies and techniques of the fu-
ture.361  Packard, however, closes on what amounts to a legal question:
“[W]hen you are manipulating, where do you stop?  Who is to fix the
point at which manipulative attempts become socially undesirable?”362
Packard’s parting question has gotten no easier over the past fifty
years, and no less pressing.
This Article takes Packard’s question seriously.  With the concept
of market manipulation, two giants of behavioral law and economics
355 See supra note 239.
356 See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
357 See Jolls et al., supra note 18, at 1511–12 (using behavioral economics to explain prefer-
ences for economically inefficient transactions in terms of “pervasive fairness norms” and depar-
tures from a “reference transaction”).
358 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Correc-
tions, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 114–16 (2006) (restricting analysis of irrationality to decisions
made by children and specific cases of force, fraud, or mistake); Richard A. Posner, Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1998).
359 See PACKARD, supra note 7, at 223–24.
360 Id. at 223.
361 Id. at 224.
362 Id. at 225.
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supply us with an elegant way to think about a range of consumer
problems.  But even giants are only so tall.  This Article updates the
work of Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar for the digital age, expanding
on their framework by layering in the important role of personaliza-
tion and the power of design.  The Article diagnoses several trends
that stand to change the face of marketing, consumer privacy, and per-
haps behavioral economics as a whole.  The Article also explains what
is different and distinct about digital market manipulation, and why
the difference is harmful.  Moreover, it offers a novel solution space
that recognizes the crucial role of incentives.  Hopefully, this Article
will get consumers, firms, and regulators thinking about the future of
selling, and perhaps even prove the Packards of the world, for once,
wrong.
